



Employment of Land Forces in Joint Operations

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Employment of Land Forces in Joint Operations

“**Ground action will remain the decisive factor**, and the role of the Army of the utmost importance: in future, as now, wars will be won on the ground. Operation *Serval* underscored the need to be prepared to **act immediately and fight during our very deployment**. Our action on the ground will aim to achieve an **optimal footprint**, in terms of both size and time-scale. Responsiveness, versatility and mobility will be the key assets of our land forces.”

Admiral Edouard Guillaud,
Joint Chief of Staff
At the National Assembly
Symposium of the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF)
4 December, 2013

SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS

1. This table lists all of the amendments readers have suggested and sent to the CDEF, regardless of their location or ranking.
2. Amendments validated by the CDEF are written **in red** in the table below, in chronological order of when they were taken into account.
3. Those amendments taken into account appear **in purple** in the new version.
4. The serial number at the bottom of the cover page of the original is corrected **(in bold, red Roman letters) and “amended day/month/ year”** is added.
5. The digital copy of the amended text replaces the previous version in all databases.

N°	Amendment	Author	Last updated
1	Update of joint doctrine references	CDEF	01/08/2014
2	Update of joint doctrine references	CDEF	01/07/2015
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FOREWORD

Approved by the Army Chief of Staff¹ on March 31, 2014, FT-03 is a “Capstone doctrine document” for the employment of land forces. It describes their action in a joint, interagency and/or multinational operational environment. This is the last volume in the now-complete series of “Capstone doctrine documents” in the Army’s doctrinal corpus.²

As an extension of national joint forces doctrine, FT-03 is consistent with NATO doctrine governing operations at that level³. It also incorporates the latest assessments pertaining to foreseeable threats and lessons learned from the latest operational commitments, as well as doctrinal developments such as the review of the Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces (DEF-DIA-01).

Based on the principles defined in the Joint Capstone Concept for Military Operations (CEF-2013 CIA-01(A))⁴, FT-03 is primarily intended for land forces, Army operational units and headquarters engaged in operations in France and overseas, as well as for other service components and joint headquarters.

Complexity relating to the human environment, stakes in conflict, the air-land space and permanent and diverse threats, as well as the joint and multinational environments of the combined arms maneuver are taken on board to formulate principles of action for the land component.

FT-03 is a reference document for the success of current operations and further adaptation of land forces for the challenges of the future.

Brigadier General Jean-François Parlanti
Director, Forces Employment Doctrine Center

1 Army Chief of Staff approval letter no. 506159/DEF/EMAT/OAT/B.EMP/NP, March 31, 2014.

2 FT-01 determines the general framework of land forces commitment, FT-02 general tactical principles, FT-04 the fundamentals of combined arms maneuver, and FT-05 operational command and control for tactical commanders.

3 FT 03 is the basis of the overall national complement to AJP 3.2 determining NATO joint doctrine for air-land operations.

4 Joint Capstone Concept for Military Operations no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP of September 12, 2013:

“Strengthening the ability to interact with various stakeholders:

- ability to conduct joint operations at all levels;
- improvement of coordination between special and conventional actions;
- improvement of coordination between actions conducted simultaneously in the physical and virtual fields;
- integration of logistical support”.

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PREFACE

The Army is central to the operational engagements of our armed forces, especially in the “protection” and “intervention” strategic functions.

The framework of these commitments is by nature joint and most often multinational and global: they require both coherence and interoperability with allies and partners committed alongside us. Achieving the desired end state determined by the political strategic level always remains the aim.

In most crises, the success of ground commitments is mostly related to the ability of land forces to control the combined arms maneuver and interact with all players in order to exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and weaken or reduce their center of gravity.

Both the strategic context and the desired end state, including control of the ground footprint in space and time and the complexity of both the human environment and the air-land space, guide the seeking of factors of success⁵ that shape how our forces are engaged.

In most cases, decisive results must be partly or fully achieved and they need to be consolidated. The task is then to identify potential options for the stabilization and disengagement phases.

Land forces can field numerous assets to achieve this in joint operations, providing a **viable, reliable and decisive option**:

- by leaving no room for ambiguity as to **France’s determination**;
- by **quickly committing forces** on and close to the ground⁶, in sufficient numbers to **achieve favorable relative combat power immediately** and combining modern and proven land warfighting functions that are fully interoperable with those of other service components;
- by being capable of “**adapting effort**” based on developments and **seamlessly capitalizing on operational advantage** while being in a position to **modulate use of force and assess damage**;

⁵ Including those defined by CEF: **agility**, ability to **combine technological superiority and operational know-how**; control of information; ability to **act in unconventional conditions** and to **cope with complex and changing operational environments**.

⁶ Especially from the Army’s *GUEPARD* disposition that contributes to the National Emergency Echelon and land forces prepositioned as presence forces (Africa and Arabian Gulf) and sovereignty forces (French Antilles, French Guiana, Indian and Pacific Oceans).

- by generating a force that can **bring on board the forces of other countries** of NATO or the EU or that are party to contingency agreements or regional alliances, in order to **share risks and facilitate mission handover as soon as the situation demands**;
- by bringing their **unique expertise in controlling a heterogeneous air-land space and associated human environment over time**, which is often a prerequisite to solving crises;
- by committing men and women in the midst of populations to ensure operations have a **human** side, which long-distance, no-contact strikes do not provide.

In the specific case of a **deployment on the national territory**, land forces provide complementary and emergency response capabilities in support of homeland security and civil support forces that act mainly on the ground. Under exceptional circumstances, their command assets allow them to provide trained and managed personnel operating versatile assets and deployable at short notice, over time and under degraded conditions, any time, anywhere.

This document describes the employment of land forces in joint operations across the whole spectrum of operations by focusing on **two main types of probable commitments**:

- national or multinational **expeditionary campaigns**⁷ (paragraph 3.1);
- **deployment and operations**⁸ on the national territory (paragraph 3.2).

The definitions of terms and acronyms used in this document can be found in the *French-English Glossary of Army Terms* (previously entitled *TTA-106*), approved on January 28, 2013 as EMP 60.641 under reference number 10/DEF/CDEF/DDo/B.CDT RENS/NP.

⁷ **Campaign**: A series of often related operations on the same theater, essentially conducted by multinational joint forces and aimed at reaching the strategic objectives – EMP 60.641 *French-English Glossary of Army Terms*, 28 January, 2013, (page 120).

⁸ DIA-01(A): “In joint documents, the term “operation” covers a variety of typologies: in the national territory, in areas under sovereignty, as part of prevention, intervention, etc.” (page 15 English version - EV).

Recap of the intent of the Joint Chief of Staff, as published in the *Capstone Concept for Military Operations (CCMO)* (no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP, September 12, 2013).

To

- achieve their operational objectives;
- meet new challenges resulting from the strategic environment described by the 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security;
- make the most of the means available;

The Armed Forces will base their action on a **dynamic synergy of efforts**, involving:

- greater interaction between strategic functions;
- greater ability to shift effort between missions and between theaters;
- increased flexibility in terms of organization, command and action.

In this context, in developing their ability to combine actions at joint, interagency and allied levels:

- The Armed Forces will take into account the enduring principles of military action, tailoring them to the realities of modern conflicts:
 - freedom of action;
 - concentration of efforts;
 - economy of force.

- They will develop five factors of operational superiority:
 - agility, understood as the combination of initiative, responsiveness and adaptability;
 - combination of technological superiority and operational know-how;
 - mastery of information;
 - ability to operate in unconventional conditions;
 - ability to cope with complex and changing operational environments.

- They will make a specific effort to:
 - develop a sufficient level of autonomy in situational assessment, decision-making and operational action;
 - strengthen their ability to operate with stakeholders of varying natures;
 - exert leverage within alliances and coalitions;
 - improve the integration of offensive and defensive cyber action within operations;
 - increase subsidiarity and adaptability in terms of organization and command.

CHAPTER 1

TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES IN A COMPLEX AND CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The adaptability, flexibility and versatility of land forces can be applied to diverse theaters and situations.

The complexity, unpredictability and intermingling sought by a most often hybrid adversary require situational awareness, reversible maneuvers and the ability to discriminate.

The capacity of land forces to impose their tempo on the adversary, synchronize their operations and work within the timeframe determined by political authorities directly influences the ability of a joint force to resolve crises.

1.1 Ensuring operational coherence in all contexts

Land forces are always engaged in a joint, national or multinational – and often interagency – context. Their effectiveness relies upon ensuring operational coherence, interoperability and a comprehensive approach, allowing them to be deployed in various physical environments.

1.1.1 A joint environment

While service components⁹ mostly act in their specific environments¹⁰, joint operations usually aim ultimately to achieve results primarily in the air-land environment.

The simplistic separation between different physical environments does not stand up to operational reality. Joint action aims to achieve converging effects by combining the efforts of all service components.

⁹ According to DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014) Doctrine for the Employment of the French Armed Forces no. 128/DEF/CICDE/ NP of 12 June, 2014, "land, air, sea and special operations components"(page 21).

¹⁰ DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014) "Differences between components result from the significant difference of the three services in terms of human environment, and from the disparity of assets and terms of employment"(page 56 EV).

"It consists of being able to face extremely diverse situations: diversity of environments, since, in addition to the three traditional areas of confrontation (land, air, sea), which cover very heterogeneous realities, two immaterial confrontation fields will become increasingly important: cyberspace and the field of perceptions" (page 7 EV). Confrontation in the extra-atmospheric space is of increasing importance in particular in relation with the development of anti-satellite weapons.

As land forces are always committed with at least one other component, their tactical maneuver benefits from actions conducted from the air and sea. They themselves produce effects that prepare, support or prolong the action of other components.

1.1.2 A multinational context

The engagement of forces in a multinational context is increasingly common because the international community favors conflict management in a multilateral framework whose legality is guaranteed by the United Nations. It also helps strengthen the legitimacy of action, as a single-nation operation, may result in questions as to the intentions and political objectives pursued. Furthermore, a coalition usually allows the sharing of capacities, costs, and human and political risks.

The multinational context of engagements does, however, create certain constraints. The differing interests of the various coalition partners may, for example, undermine the effectiveness of a multinational force.

Moreover, the differences as regards political and military objectives, cultures, languages, rules of engagement with the notions of national laws and *caveats*¹¹, and technical and operational levels can create problems of mutual understanding, interoperability and inconsistency and weaken the coalition. Skilled adversaries could take advantage of that.

1.1.3 A comprehensive approach

“The global approach in managing external crises:

Consolidating fragile states or restoring their stability requires implementing a set of complementary and consistent actions in every field. Greater coordination is necessary in the framework of a global interministerial and multilateral approach with the aim of optimising the use of limited resources.

A credible capacity for prevention and civilian-military crisis management is of the utmost importance to our defence and national security strategy [...]

11 DIA-D1(A)1DEF(2014), “The national armed forces contributing to the operation are not expected to:

- a. execute tasks under restrictions of use of a political or operational nature (caveats);
- b. act according to principles that would contravene their own laws and regulations.

Consequently, a state may restrict or specify multinational ROE.

French caveats of political or operational nature are issued by the CPCO (Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center). Caveats of a legal nature are issued by the EMA (French Joint Headquarters), more specifically by the JUROPS (military legal section) and the DAJ (legal affairs directorate). The operation commander is part of this approach.” (page 19 EV).

If, despite these preventive efforts, France is called on to participate in a crisis management operation, the intervention forces must be supplemented, as soon as possible, by specialised civilian capacities. Such deployment must be closely coordinated with military action, which in turn must create the minimal security conditions required for sustainable stabilisation allowing civilian personnel to conduct their operations.”¹²

As environments become more complex and threats evolve, close coordination of all civilian and military players is of utmost importance. That always involves integrated planning and conduct of operations.

A historical and cultural approach should be adopted to understand the origins of a crisis, local populations, and adversaries, as well as the roles of all stakeholders¹³ and how they organize their work, including allies, security forces – police, Gendarmerie, firefighters, civil support¹⁴ – members of local, national and international justice organizations, teams of other government departments¹⁵ and agencies, international organizations, non-governmental agencies (NGOs), and the media.

As players mainly operate on the ground and in the crisis region, it is up to land forces down to the lowest tactical levels to be in regular contact with them and coordinate their actions. In this context, interagency cooperation is of the utmost importance in national or coalition operations overseas.

Moreover, a comprehensive approach and interagency cooperation are major characteristics of missions in the national territory (see Paragraph 3.2).

1.1.4 An interagency approach: land forces in the national territory

Land forces may be deployed on the national territory in support of certain government services, or even as substitutes under exceptional circumstances. Employment framework has to be part of an interagency environment.

Operations on the national territory are based on a **legal framework of ordinary law** or, in matters of the utmost urgency, of specific legal orders, such as a **state of emergency** or the application of **Article 16 of the French Constitution**.

¹² French White Paper on Defense and National Security, May 2013, page 93 (English version - EV).

¹³ DIA-01(A)1: “comprehensive option : Response to a crisis or conflict which includes the use of all available power instruments (diplomacy, military, information, economy)”(page 60 EV).

¹⁴ See the protocol between the Army and the General Directorate of Civil Support and Crisis Management.

¹⁵ Including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via its diplomatic network.

Defense support to civilian authorities results from a **requisition** or **request for assistance**. Service members always act under military authority, even if their action comes under the responsibility of civilian authorities. Their training and equipment allows them to respond to situations requiring capabilities the civilian authorities lack, under the so-called *4i* rule – *Inexistants* (**non-existent**), *Insuffisants* (**inadequate**), *Inadaptés* (**unsuitable**) and *Indisponibles* (**unavailable**).

The particular case of land forces deployment on the national territory is addressed in Paragraph 3.2. The remainder of this document deals more extensively with operations outside the national territory. However, when operating in an air-land environment at joint level, numerous principles can still be applied on the national territory (logic of environment and force organization).

1.2 Exercising pressure on the adversary until contact in a complex air-land space

The *CEF*¹⁶ highlights six major challenges for the French Armed Forces; three of them are particularly acute for ground commitments:

- mastering the operational tempo in its three dimensions: speed, synchronization and duration;
- controlling the whole range of various domains, although they cannot be everywhere at once;
- being effective while complying with legal and ethical imperatives, when confronted with adversaries less constrained by such obligations.

FT-01 defines the notions of symmetric, dissymmetric and asymmetric conflict. Recent operational engagements have confirmed the relevance of such a threat classification, to which hybrid, more ambiguous and evolving threats must be added, at the crossroads between regular and irregular combatants, between military and criminal threats.

1.2.1 Heterogeneous land space and time

Maneuvering on and close to the ground is characterized by **compartmented** terrain and tactical sequencing. It leads to a high segmentation of combat systems and causes a level of complexity that requires **decentralized combat** and command of the land forces.

¹⁶ Capstone Concept for Military Operations (CCMO), September 12, 2013.

Control of terrain in both time and space, requires the **deployment of land forces suited and prepared for**:

- the **physical environment**, regardless of its nature (deserts, jungles, coastal, urban or mountainous areas, etc.), whatever the **geographical location** and **climate**;
- the required timeframes and rhythms, day and night, in the utmost urgency or after a long build-up phase, on a constant basis or sequentially, for a short time or over the long term.

The *CEF* – *CCMO* – confirms the relevance of the **principle of freedom of action** in military efforts involving land forces. Beyond this principle, land forces in operations often have to control heterogeneous physical spaces over the long term.

To ensure their freedom of action and control the air-land space, the land forces must be prepared to live and conduct missions within it. It requires generic and sometimes specific **operational readiness**, based on the principle of differentiation.

1.2.2 Amidst populations, at stake in the battle of perceptions

The requirement of controlling the human dimension of the action comes on top of controlling physical spaces. Indeed, **land spaces are marked by the presence of populations** that are often sources of friction.

And yet the populace is a key stake of crises. **Community support is therefore a success factor** for both land forces and the enemy in counterinsurgency and more broadly in stabilization phases. In counterinsurgency conflicts, irregular adversaries aim to melt into the local populace. The battle of perceptions is then an essential mission component.

Depending on the cultural environment and political and economic stakes, the land component is often the most visible part of France's engagement in a theater. It can be considered as a liberation force, but also as a source of income and sometimes an occupation force. It must therefore gain acceptance otherwise it risks creating the conditions for becoming bogged down. In this context, land forces are a **major actor with a human face, shaping perceptions** of populations and adversaries.

Urban areas are growing constantly across the world, **concentrating populations in restrained and compartmented spaces**, often with internal disparities and frictions fuelled by cramped conditions. They are clearly major stakes and so potentially a difficult battleground for land forces, combining the strong constraints of a demanding physical environment with the specificities of a human urban environment.

1.2.3 Facing permanent, varied and shifting risks and threats

Risks and threats were described in the 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security. It is worth emphasizing their specificities for land forces here.

The land environment includes specific risks, including natural (earthquakes, floods, etc.), health-related (pandemics, water, food) and technological risks. Land forces can have to face them both at home and overseas. They can cause humanitarian crises and may become aggravating factors in the resolution of crises and armed conflicts.

From a land perspective, conventional threats include:

- the **symmetric threat**, with similar belligerents;
- the **dissymmetric threat**, with similar belligerents that, however, have unequal military capabilities;
- the **asymmetric threat**, where one belligerent, poorly armed for symmetric or dissymmetric conflicts, deliberately places itself in a field different from that where its adversary has manifest superiority.

Asymmetric adversaries become irregular combatants and emphasize the absolute disparity of means and courses of action¹⁷. They then mitigate their qualitative and quantitative inferiority by often selecting covered, inhabited terrains that enhance their protection and, if possible, foster intermingling of standing forces and populations in order to reduce the technological and numerical advantage of the forces committed against them.

Hybrid threats

Modern warfighters are increasingly confronted with global, diverse and shifting threats. Study of their development over the last decade has led to a definition of the notion of hybridity¹⁸.

17 FT-01 (ENG): *Winning the Battle, Building Peace*, Chapter 1: New World – New Conflicts, (page 18).

18 This approach to the hybrid threat appears in the French White Paper on Defense and National Security (page 85 EV) and is a view held by most experts on Western security and defense.

In France, the DIA-01(A) states that our adversaries may also use hybrid strategies, aiming to pose diverse threats to us. They are carried out in different fields of confrontation, simultaneously or successively. The hybrid nature of threats is even more likely when the adversary – a mix of civilian and military, state and non-state elements – is characterized by a hybrid nature (page 17 EV).

The *US Army Doctrine Publication "Unified Land Operations"* (ADP 3-0 of October 2011, page 4) highlights the types of hybrid threats in the chapter entitled "Character of the threat". The *US ARMY Capstone Concept*, written in October 2012 by the TRADOC, describes a convergent analysis of the threat (pp. 7-8).

The *UK Army Doctrine Publication "Operations"* (ADP 71 632 of November 2010, pages 3-9 and 3-10) and the *UK Joint Concept Note 2/12 "Future Land Operating Concept"* (JCN 2/12 of May 2012, pp. 1-4 to 1-6) also emphasize hybrid threats while stating that the risk of an interstate conflict has faded away without being totally impossible.

Hybrid threats¹⁹ introduce a kind of total warfare to the extent that they combine conventional warfare, guerrilla, insurrection, religious and ethnic fanaticism, terrorism, organized crime and cyber warfare.

To counter them, military forces must be engaged to neutralize their conventional and irregular armed elements, alongside police forces to break up the organized crime and clandestine networks that finance them. Hybrid threats also include the use of simple or elaborate “dirty” weapons with nuclear, chemical or biological components and explosive devices of all kinds²⁰. They use new technologies, even information warfare in psychological and perceptive dimensions. They include manipulation of the masses, using populations as shields, camouflage or logistical and intelligence support²¹.

As such, recent operations in Libya, Iraq and Mali are good examples of a shift from dissymmetric conflicts towards asymmetric and hybrid threats that are ultimately more complex for modern joint forces abiding by the laws of war to confront in the long term. Unbalanced and weakened dissymmetric adversaries then change tactics to skirt around the operational superiority of our forces and seek to bog them down. Such adversaries often melt into populations and flout the law of armed conflict. They exercise direct pressure at political and strategic level through spectacular operations (harassment, terrorism, suicide attacks, and explosive devices), that are easily relayed and even amplified in the context of the information society.

19 There are currently several definitions of hybrid threats. The concept developed for many years has progressively come into doctrinal works of Western countries. Today's definition of hybrid threats in NATO works is “*those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.*”

20 Including *improvised explosive devices*: makeshift or improvised devices containing destructive, deadly, harmful, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemical products. They are used to destroy, neutralize, harass and distract attention. They can include military components but they are generally built of non-military components. The translation “improvised” for “improvisé” is inappropriate, as underscored by *DIA 3.15 La lutte contre les EEI* (page 12).

21 The example of Hezbollah against Israel in 2006 emphasized use by non-State enemies of conventional means in conventional and unconventional ways: antitank missiles, long-range rockets, dug-in and camouflaged CPs, superior radio, wire and fiber-optic communication equipment, dissemination of forces within towns, and communication using new forms of technology.

Mali: Operation Serval, 2013

Dissymmetric and asymmetric threats and close combat

Between January and April 2013, during the phase of neutralizing the Groupes Armés Terroristes, (GATs) (Armed Terrorist Groups) in northern Mali, all Serval brigade units faced a fanatical, aggressive and ruthless enemy that favored first of all a course of action using dissymmetric threats, before quickly shifting to asymmetric threats. It did not, however, fully use the support and protection of populations, as insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria do.

Once vehicle raids to the South had been stopped by Special Forces and airstrikes, fielding land forces forced the terrorist groups to conduct a tactical withdrawal, opting for camouflage and brutal short-range attacks. They then attempted to reduce our technological superiority by exposing themselves and opening fire as close as possible to our leading elements and even trying to be overtaken.

In late February 2013, during Operation Panther in the Adrar Ifoghas mountains, AQIM's terrorist groups closely defended their positions by sometimes playing dead in order to surprise French soldiers at very close range. Faced with this modus operandi, the Airborne GTIA / Bn TF gained ground without leaving residual elements behind them, while maintaining a high operational pace.

On March 1, 2013, during Operation Doro 1 in the area of Imenas, GTIA 2 was faced with several assault waves of MUJWA fighters. The enemy and its pick-up trucks were sometimes destroyed by infantry light weapons fire or by VBCI²² guns at distances of a few meters.

Since May 2013, the terrorist groups have adopted resolutely asymmetric courses of action based on terrorist attacks, IEDs and harassment.

²² Véhicule Blindé de Combat d'Infanterie: French AIFV.

1.2.4 In an information-centric legal and political strategic environment

To shape public perceptions, belligerents confront each other in **an information environment whose media component** plays a critical role. Powerful recent tools like **the Internet and social networks** are platforms for expression at the adversary's disposal for communication, misinformation and undermining of operation legitimacy. As far as the media (journalists, radio and TV networks, media groups) are concerned, they are mainly deployed on the ground and therefore in direct interaction with land forces. Similarly, **the centers of political, economic and religious power**, always located in major cities, are central conflict stakes and hence often located close to the action of land forces.

Lastly, **the legal environment, a necessary framework for operations**, must always be considered with the utmost caution given the complexity of situations and the proximity of players on the ground, including the media, security forces, NGOs and other international organizations as well as local and international judiciaries.

The land forces therefore operate within a comprehensive legal framework encompassing:

- international law, and more precisely international humanitarian law (Geneva law) whose goal is to protect those who are not or are no longer²³ directly involved in hostilities;
- provisions regulating the conduct of hostilities (The Hague law);
- the laws and customs of war;
- national laws of host countries and places of confrontation in the theater of operations;
- French criminal law.

In any case, commanders are responsible for legal compliance during operations²⁴, assisted by Legal Advisors (LEGAD)²⁵ who are embedded in all operational land forces CPs²⁶.

23 One refers here to injured or ill warfighters, shipwreck victims as well as prisoners of war who have ceased to take part in hostilities.

24 Refer to EMP 50.654 *“Manual on Legal Fundamentals for the Force Commander in Operations outside the National Territory”* no. 30/DEF/CDEF/DDO/BSEO/NP of March 1, 2013, and the *“Study on International Human Rights Law and Today’s Conflicts (Enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflicts by the Land Forces)”* no. 285/DEF/CDEF/DDO/BSEO of 18 October, 2013.

25 Legal Advisor – DIA-1(A), “Anticipation and advice are more than necessary, especially with recourse to experts [EMA/JUROPs at the strategic level, Legal Advisor (LEGAD) at the operational and tactical staff level]” (page 19 EV).

26 Always for levels 1 and 2 (corps and division) and often for level 3 (brigade). France provides LEGAD in compliance with Article 82 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

These aspects demonstrate the **strategic nature of deploying land forces**, which also operate in a **political environment** that is both **national** (French decision to field troops), **multinational** (coalition with allies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations) and **regional and local** (host country or crisis theater, neighboring and partner countries).

1.2.5 Plus the challenge of cyberspace²⁷

Cyberspace is a comprehensive space made up of telecommunications networks, information systems, digital information and online services. It constitutes the “fifth battlespace” and also encompasses the entire electromagnetic space: an older battlespace incorporating electronic warfare. This developing cyber threat comes from the exploitation of new forces vulnerabilities linked to battlespace digitization and networking. It is possible to act, conduct observations, fight and inflict damage on the enemy in this developing space.

All digital networks, the “nervous system” of the land forces, are part of cyberspace. Cyber conflicts have become a reality in joint operations down to the tactical level. This is why the CEF (CCMO) laid down a cyber-goal among the five objectives identified for the Armed Forces: “Improve the integration of offensive and defensive cyber action within our operations.”²⁸

Land forces are part of the joint response disposition for cyber threats. They have adopted its dual-posture approach: on the one hand, they ensure the protection of their networks using cyber protection measures (previously known as Information System Security). On the other, in addition to that static posture, they also ensure an active, in-depth defense of their information systems using cyber defense, or Defensive Cyber Warfare. Attacks must be detected, reported to the joint cyber defense functional chain (the general officer in charge of cyber defense at the Joint Operations Center) and acted upon correctly to avoid affecting the smooth running of ongoing maneuvers, either using cyber methods or by more conventional assets. Combining these two postures aims to ensure cyber security.

27 References:

DIA-3.40 Cyberdefense (DR) N° 82/DEF/CICDE/DR, 28 March 2014.

Repeals *DIA 6.3* and *RDIA-2012/006*, study report on cyber conflict in combined arms operations 2014.

28 *Capstone Concept for Military Operations (CCMO)*, October 12, 2013, (page 7).

CHAPTER 2

INTEGRATING LAND FORCES INTO A JOINT OPERATION

This chapter implements the major principles of joint operations described in national and allied doctrine reference documents. It underlines similar views and interoperability key points for the land forces, with reference to other national or allied service components. Seeking optimization of effects, which ensures the operational superiority of a force, necessarily involves integration of all air, maritime and land players.

2.1 Principles for engagement of joint force components

2.1.1 Sequencing of joint operations

From a doctrinal point of view, any operational deployment follows the following main stages:

Stage 0 – Political decision to engage

Stage 1 – Operational planning and force generation

Once the decision to engage has been taken, operational planning work and the force generation process begin simultaneously, defining responsibilities assigned to the land forces commander and the size of forces to be committed. In emergency situations, the national emergency echelon is activated, contributed to by the land forces GUEPARD disposition²⁹.

Stage 2 – Deployment

Force and power projection clearly mark the beginning of a military engagement and largely frame it.

²⁹ References:

- *PIA 7.01 ENU: Échelon National d'Urgence* (National Emergency Echelon), no. 005840/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/DR, 16 June 2014.
- *PIA 7.01.1: Guidelines for Setting up the GUEPARD Disposition*, no. D-13-010873/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/DR, September 12, 2013.

The CEF³⁰ reaffirmed that armed forces must be prepared to participate in all phases of a major operation, particularly the critical initial theater entry phase. This capacity means mastering specific skills, including planning and conduct of amphibious and airborne operations.

Wherever possible, any force projection is preceded by theater reconnaissance conducted by specialized teams to assess access and facility capabilities.

Stage 3 – Intervention

This may take different forms:

- it can take place in the very crisis theater and may be followed by a stabilization phase, and then a normalization phase. The decision to commit land forces to a theater indicates determination to restore a climate conducive to normalization of operations;
- it can enable “remote” control of the crisis – i.e. a containment phase – prior to or even after a surveillance phase;
- the intervention can be limited to a specific operation or power projection.

During the intervention phase, the armed forces may accomplish different missions, depending on the objectives pursued:

- shaping missions;
- offensive missions;
- defensive missions;
- military assistance missions;
- environment control and security missions;
- support missions.

This categorization also covers cross-cutting functions such as intelligence (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance - ISR), as they directly contribute to the success of these different missions.

³⁰ Capstone Concept for Military Operations (CCMO), September 12, 2013.

Stage 4 – Stabilization (depending on type of operation, see Paragraph 3.1.4)

During stabilization, armed forces focus on:

- military assistance missions;
- environment control and security missions;
- support missions.

Stage 5 – Normalization (depending on type of operation, see Paragraph 3.1.5)

During normalization, armed forces focus on:

- military assistance missions;
- security and support missions.

Stage 6 – Disengagement

Both “on time” and contingency disengagements present vulnerabilities. They involve:

- advance planning specific to actions linked to contingency disengagements;
- maintaining a “way out” at all times during engagement (APOD or SPOD);
- maintaining sufficient command and control capabilities in the areas of the comprehensive approach and in support until the last moment;
- managing time constraints while compromising between speed and protection of forces.

2.1.2 Role and missions of the Joint Force Land Component

The role and missions of the land forces are based on the need to impose their will upon an adversary in an environment subject to specific constraints.

Success factors when engaging the Joint Force Land Component³¹:

- unity of command, information control, subsidiarity and coherence in force organization;
- agility: combination of initiative, responsiveness and adaptability;
- favorable relative combat power based on the dynamic combination of combined arms warfighting functions in the context of joint effects;
- the morale and the ability to operate in all physical and human environments, including under degraded conditions in the long term if necessary;
- logistical self-sufficiency;
- ability to assess and understand the situation while acting in the field of perceptions;
- ability to hand over the stabilization mission to other forces (allies, UN, host country, etc.) as soon as the situation allows, supporting them if necessary (training, military assistance, intelligence, logistics, rapid response force).

Joint military action is organized in four operational functions³² – **command, manage information, operate** and **sustain**, to which the eight land warfighting functions described in FT-04³³ contribute.

31 These factors are consistent with the three principles of military action and the five factors of operational superiority that make it possible to take up the six challenges presented to the armed forces by the evolution of conflicts and strategic reality, as described in the CCMO of September 12, 2013.

32 "operational function": **DIA - 01(A): "range of operational activities which are traverse to the hierarchical organization, and which, at some levels, require decisions to be taken and coordination in the implementation of a specific organization in order to guarantee the general performance of a force"** (page 64 EV).

33 FT-04: Fundamentals of Combined Arms Maneuver, June 2011, pages 16-17.

4 Joint operational Functions	8 Land operational Functions
	<i>Universal</i>
Command Manage information	Command Command support Intelligence
	<i>In operations</i>
Operate	Contact (close combat) Combat support Actions on perceptions and the operational environment Maneuver enhancement
	<i>Universal</i>
Sustain	Logistics

Universal warfighting functions are essential for the implementation of “operations” warfighting functions aimed at producing military effects on the environment and adversary. Each land warfighting function contributes to achieving an effect defined by the combined arms commander. To this end, the land component conducts exchanges with the other service components, either through the chain of command or the functional chain, in order to increase force effectiveness, coordinated by the joint command.

For example, the specialized coordination and third dimension support cells, integrated into every land forces CP³⁴, allow optimal integration of joint fire support in addition to land fire support.

³⁴ Fire Support Coordination Center for level 2 and higher, 3D support for level 3 and liaison, observation and coordination team at GTIA level.

2.1.3 Role and missions of other Joint Force Components³⁵

2.1.3.1 Role and missions of the Joint Force Air Component³⁶

The specificity of the general role of a Joint Force Air component resides in the two main characteristics of airspace:

- The airspace does not have obstacles³⁷ when operating above ground level: it is a fluid, fairly homogeneous and almost transparent space.
- The airspace has a natural interface with land and maritime spaces.

This is why the Air Component contributes decisively to separately assessing situations, guaranteeing independent strategic choices and the relevance of operational decisions taken during engagement.

Similarly, as the airspace is common to all environments, it is used by all other service components. Controlling it (control, coordination, and “deconfliction”) is vital for the force’s action. The Air Component thus plays a decisive role in ensuring sufficient freedom of action, sometimes obtained through prior or simultaneous actions aimed at acquiring air superiority.

Moreover, it enables rapid power and force projection, i.e. intervening and transporting forces and assets needed for a military operation, or support for State action – at short notice and anywhere in the world.

During an engagement, the Air Component helps increase freedom of maneuver and rapid change of posture (defensive, deterrent, offensive) while using the same military assets. The Air Component may be used discreetly (surveillance) or openly (show of force, deployed airbase, etc.). These postures are reversible and can be sustained, notably thanks to aerial refueling. The employment of the Air Component thus frees forces from physical constraints and certain threats limiting land and maritime action. During initial theatre entry and engagement, airborne systems (airdrops, air assault and air transport) allow the Air Component to contribute to seizing the initiative, adapting courses of action, conducting diversion, cover and in-depth actions and therefore ensuring freedom of action.

35 References:

- Joint Capstone Concept for Military Operations no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP of September 12, 2013.
- *DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014)* – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces no.128/DEF/CICDE/NP, 12 June, 2014.
- AJP 3.2 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, October 28, 2009 (under revision).

36 References:

- *DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014)* – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces no.128/DEF/CICDE/NP, 12 June, 2014.
- AJP 3.3a – Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, with its national supplement, *DIA 3.3 “Joint Doctrine for Air Operations”* (in preparation, to be released in 2014).

37 Even if airspace is divided up to allow the traffic of numerous players.

It also contributes to focusing efforts in coordination and support of other service components through its air-to-surface capabilities.

Its flexibility and the mobility and ubiquity offered by air maneuver:

- enable us to operate and strike accurately with different weapons almost any time, anywhere³⁸;
- represent a force multiplier and risk reducer;
- produce a psychological advantage over the adversary.

Lastly, the Air Component coordinates its action with other airspace users. The diversity of mobile assets and threats, their speed and interweaving require dedicated, responsive and interoperable command and control structures so as to coordinate actions in support of the joint force. To do so, it relies on an effective surveillance, detection, identification, decision and control system, enabling it to organize managing the entire airspace of engagements while ensuring other components' freedom of action.

In this context, the Air Component is generally delegated Airspace Control Authority (ACA). The ACA is a coordination authority. If it cannot resolve conflicting requests for airspace expressed by several components, it does not have decision-making authority and must refer to the Joint Force Commander for final decisions.

2.1.3.2 Role and missions of the Joint Force Maritime Component³⁹

The specificity of the general role of a Joint Force Maritime Component directly results from two original characteristics of the air-maritime environment:

- considerable freedom of movement and action, especially under water, guaranteeing great discretion;
- a vast, uninhabited space near major centers of human life.

Freedom of action on the high seas remains a decisive advantage. Beyond its importance for vital economic flows and the resulting need for protection, it offers the flexibility needed to continuously project assets providing knowledge, anticipation and prevention in potential crisis areas.

38 Most often, if the Air Component has first reduced the enemy's air defense capabilities, has air superiority at least locally, and depending on weather conditions that may constrain the employment of air assets, even if technological progress regularly reduce their impact. In any case, restrictions of use in terms of collateral damage or risks of friendly fire also need to be taken into account.

39 References:

- DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014) – *Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces* no.128/DEF/CICDE/NP, 12 June, 2014.
- AJP 3.1 – *Allied Joint Maritime Operations*, April 2004.
- AJP 3.2 - *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, of October 28, 2009 (under revision).

In the air-maritime environment, the warship, being multi-purpose, is the only instrument able to operate at long distances over time and impose its will. By combining available capabilities, the Maritime Component offers a wide range of assets for joint actions (Aircraft Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Force, Frigate Force and naval cruise missile submarines, etc.) while protecting the force against any threats, especially submarine threats.

The objective of the commitment may be security or interdiction of maritime routes, in which case the force is organized around the Maritime Component.

However, in almost any other situation, the Maritime Component plays a decisive role by diversifying strategic response options and ensuring, with almost no non-military constraints, the projection of the force to almost any potential engagement area. It also enables both force and power projection.

In the case of force projection, it may contribute directly to a “initial entry” operation using its amphibious capabilities and support of most air-land actions from the sea.

The Maritime Component can also provide ship-based sustainment and command assets, therefore limiting the footprint of the deployed force on the ground.

2.1.3.3 Role and missions of the Joint Force Special Operations Component⁴⁰

Special operations are targeted, discrete - but not clandestine - military operations, aimed at objectives of strategic interest. Commanded by the Joint Chief of Staff, they are planned and conducted by the Special Operations Command (COS-SOC). Protected by a higher degree of confidentiality, they take place under tight political-military control, attributed to a short decision loop guaranteeing a high level of responsiveness and offering a high degree of reversibility. Special Operations differ from conventional operations in their time-space framework, acceptance of a higher level of political risk, specific joint procedures and a lesser logistic footprint. Selected Special Forces, trained and equipped for executing sensitive missions, are systematically involved as part of these procedures, as are Conventional Forces.

⁴⁰ References:

- DIA-3.5 – (2014) *Special Operations Doctrine*, no. 195/DEF/CICDE/DR, September 29, 2014;
- AJP 3.2 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, October 28, 2009 (under revision);
- AJP 3.5 (A) - *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, December, 2013 ratified by France with reservations, - DIA 3.5 (2014).

Actions led by the special operations component ahead of or alongside Force deployment fall into the three following categories:

- Direct actions linked to targeted commando actions (Direct Actions);
- Special research and reconnaissance actions linked to Intelligence (Special Reconnaissance);
- Environment and influence actions (Military assistance and indirect actions).

2.2 Synergy between Joint Force components

2.2.1 The fundamental notions of the “Supported” and “Supporting” commanders

Coordination between components is the work of the Force Commander, who retains responsibility even when, from time to time, it is necessary to delegate OPCON⁴¹ to some or all components in the interests of subsidiarity. Moreover, each component has to design its maneuver in accordance with the others. Coordination is based first of all on the “supported-supporting”⁴² principle and separation in time and space.

“At the tactical level, relationships between component commanders are regulated by the principle “supported commander/supporting commander: assistance provided through fire, manoeuvre, provision of resources or services [e.g. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)], or combination of these four elements. There is no hierarchical relationship in this principle; it is rather a functional relationship by which the needs of the supported commander, within the framework of a mission, are met. Be that as it may, a joint integration at the lowest level and fluidity of the joint combinations are recommended so as to achieve an effect on the adversary.”⁴³

Using the “supported–supporting” principle, the Force Commander defines combat support components and determines priorities in accordance with the main effect. The effective management of this principle enables the commander to speed up efforts for certain operational phases and maintain tempo. This relationship is dynamic by nature and can evolve during campaigns.

41 Reference: DIA-3 – Part 1: *General Principles of Command of Joint Operations* no. 217/DEF/CICDE/DR (Restricted), July 30, 2010, pages 35 and 46.

42 AAP-06 – NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English – French), 2013 v2, April 3, 2013.

Supported commander /commandant bénéficiaire

A commander with primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and receiving forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders.

Supporting commander /commandant en soutien

A commander providing a supported commander with forces or other support or developing a supporting plan.

43 DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014) – *Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces*, 12 June, 2014 (page 34 EV).

The supported commander is responsible for carrying out military missions given by the joint commander, having authority to direct the combat support effort which includes priorities, battle rhythm and the effects of operations to conduct.

The supporting commander must have overall understanding of the mission of the supported commander, his tasks, his intent and his operational plan. He must also ensure that his activities are carried out with the coordination and flexibility required by the supported commander.

2.2.2 The role of the land component in joint operations

The land forces are organized, equipped and trained to conduct decisive actions on and close to the ground and amidst populations, as well as to control the land environment. They therefore fully participate in intimidation, containment, neutralization, security and facilitation effects. As the adversary may adapt tactics to counter stand-off strikes (camouflage, dispersion, dilution in inhabited zones, use of human shields, etc.), forces on the ground are needed to:

- **provide intelligence and precisely assess situations** (key role of human intelligence, an essential addition to technical intelligence);
- **restrict the adversary on the ground** by fighting them and identifying targets to reduce risks of collateral damage;
- **control the land environment**, including in the long term;
- **contribute to population security**;
- **contribute to training viable local armed forces** (training, Military Assistance) and establish the security needed to build local police forces and support Security System Reform;
- **participate in disarmament programs** (control process for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration);
- **prepare handover of the stabilization mission to other forces** that often cannot intervene unless the situation is sufficiently controlled and they are helped;
- **act on perceptions by participating in psychological operations** based on human relations, which need to be supported by proximity between land forces and populations;
- **foster the development of a comprehensive maneuver** by establishing security conditions enabling non-military players (police and security forces, governance, law, development, etc.) to be deployed and contribute to crisis settlement. These coordinated actions have to occur over time and according to a campaign plan organized in three main parts:

- **security** (especially with police and civilian security forces, supplementing military action);
- **governance** (the “rule of law,” central, regional and local government structure, organization of government agencies and justice);
- **development** (reconstruction, transport, energy, health, education, economy, agriculture, etc.).

Two strong trends can be identified from the conflicts of the last thirty years:

- fielding of land forces always expresses a **strong political commitment of the Nation**;
- stand-off actions are not sufficient when **an area of conflict needs to be stabilized**.

In **coercion**, land forces must defeat enemy forces in close combat using an air-land maneuver supported by other service components. The objective is then to quickly inflict military defeat upon the adversary before proceeding to a stabilization phase.

In **stabilization**, land forces must provide sufficient security for civilian and military players. To avoid becoming bogged down, and with the constraints of reducing risks and costs, only the bare minimum of capacities must be committed, in a controlled time-space framework. This is why stabilization is usually conducted within a **coalition** and **security is handed over** as soon as possible to an international or regional force, then a local force.

Examples of massive stand-off strikes followed by commitment of land forces with notions of relative combat power

In Kosovo: In a province of 10,900 km² and 1.8 million inhabitants (roughly the size and population of the *département of Gironde*), against Serbia with an estimated 20,000 troops deployed in Kosovo as well as 28,000 police and paramilitary personnel, NATO air strikes (58,574 sorties) conducted over nearly three months in 1999 did not succeed in compelling the equivalent of four Serbian armored mechanized brigades to withdraw. **Six allied combined arms brigades** (including one French) ie. 50,000 troops – had to be deployed in June 1999 to force the Serbian armed forces to withdraw to Serbia, then allow progressive stabilization of the region and its handover to local security forces supported by NATO (KFOR), the UN (UNMIK) and the EU (EULEX).





In Afghanistan: In 2001, in a country of 652,000 km² and counting 25 million inhabitants, against an enemy estimated at 45,000 men (Taliban and their allies), air strikes combined with the commitment of US Special Forces and local Northern Alliance forces were soon boosted by commitment of allied combined arms brigades to defeat the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda's rear base. This coercion phase was followed by a stabilization phase lasting more than twelve years, with up to **140,000 coalition troops committed by 2011** as well as 100,000 private military contractor personnel and 175,000 Afghan security forces troops. The phased handover of the mission to local security and armed forces, trained and instructed by the coalition, began in 2011 before near total withdrawal in 2014.

In Kuwait and Iraq: In a country of 437,000 km² and 28 million inhabitants, against an enemy estimated at 500,000 troops, in both 1991 and 2003, numerous air and cruise missile strikes were followed by a massive commitment on the ground. In 1991, **939,000 troops were committed in a US-led coalition**, including one French division reinforced by two US brigades, and for the British, 53,000 troops including 29,000 from ground forces (one division with two combined arms brigades). In 2003, 330,000 troops were committed on the ground, and then in stabilization, with an average of 30 US and allied brigades fielded over eight years.

In Mali: In a country of 1,240,000 km² and 15 million inhabitants, against an enemy estimated at 3,000 troops equipped with light weapons and all-terrain vehicles, the combined use of air strikes, Special Forces actions, and the commitment of ground forces enabled us to defeat the armed terrorist groups threatening Bamako. The **combined arms brigade-sized land forces** also counted a combined arms brigade CP, the light CP of the airborne brigade, a reduced brigade CP with several hundred instructors to train the Malian Army (EUTM mission), as well as command elements, Army Special Forces (SF), intelligence, logistics and command support brigades. Altogether, it led to **three combined arms brigades' CPs** and four specialized and SF brigades' CPs being fully or partially committed, with **3,800 ground troops in the Serval brigade in February 2013** in Mali. Stabilization was gradually handed over to the Malian Army, the African-led AFISMA⁴⁴ mission, and the MINUSMA⁴⁵ international force, while a reduced French land component remained to support operations.

44 African-led International Support Mission to Mali.

45 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

2.2.3 Interactions between Joint Force components

2.2.3.1 Interactions between Land and the Air components (LCC/ACC)⁴⁶

As regards interactions between Joint Force components, land forces in operations most frequently interact with the Air component.

This is carried out in line with the three principles outlined in AJP 3.2 “*Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*”: “independence,” “synchronization,” and “integration.” The air maneuver is integrated into the joint maneuver through attachment of liaison elements as well as specialized teams from the three services to all necessary CP levels of both components.

The joint team made up of those liaison elements and specialized teams is the capstone of the integrated air maneuver, including air support to the air-land maneuver. Air-Land Integration (ALI)⁴⁷ covers operational and tactical levels. It is based on personnel from the three services with recognized skills enhancing cross-environment understanding as well as cross-domain coordination (intelligence, fire support, and electronic warfare).

In most operations, gaining air superiority or even supremacy is essential. It must be achieved before land forces are committed.

In terms of command structure, coordination between the LCC and the ACC is conducted by:

- the LCC’s Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), embedded in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)⁴⁸, the key element for conducting air operations;
- the Air Operations Coordination Center Land(AOCC), located in the LCC CP.

⁴⁶ References:

- DIA-01(A)1 DEF(2014) – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces.
- AJP 3.2 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, October 28, 2009 (under revision).
- DIA 3.3.2 – Air Support, no. 154/DEF/CICDE/NP, June 27, 2014.
- DIA 3.3.4 – Ground-to-Air Defense, no. 089/DEF/CICDE/NP, June 17, 2013.
- DIA 3.3.5 – Airspace Control, no. 140/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 18, 2013.

⁴⁷ The integration of air support (fire support and intelligence) in the air-land maneuver was outlined through the Air-Land Integration (ALI) concept detailed in DIA 3.3.2 (Air Support).

⁴⁸ Operation *Harmattan* demonstrated the capacity of Army Aviation units to operate under OPCON of a CAOC (located in Poggio, which came under the Naples-based JFC that had delegated to it OPCON on air units), as no LCC had been deployed.

The Air component makes major contributions to Land Forces operations:

- **protection** against enemy air attacks through air defense and defensive and offensive counter-air actions⁴⁹;
- **pre-commitment intelligence and actions**;
- General Air Support by Air Interdiction (AI) or Close Air Support (CAS) for troops in contact or close to the enemy;
- strategic, intra-theater or tactical **air transport and supply**;
- **specific support** for amphibious and airborne operations (see description of temporary components in Paragraph 2.2.3.5).

In this context, increased cooperation between components implies mutual understanding and constant seeking of synergies. Coherence must be ensured in the following areas:

- **the vision of the area of joint operations**, extended for the Air component and more focused on restricted compartments for the Land component at tactical level, because of major differences⁴⁹ in operational reach and weapon range;
- **command structures** between
 - a short loop for the Air component, committing less resources and allowing a very direct link between the CAOC and aircraft;
 - and a loop with several integration levels for the Land component, ensuring intermediate coherence and command levels between the LCC and combat units, required for the combined arms maneuver.
- **planning and sequencing operations**: with on the one side the requirement to plan air operations several days ahead (via an Air Task Order – ATO) and on the other the conduct of operations on the ground.

Facilitating synergies thus involves:

- integrating air-land and air actions to achieve complementary effects and reduce the risks of friendly fire or collateral damage;
- aiming for the best possible coordination by pooling planning and sharing tried-and-tested procedures in conduct;

⁴⁹ Defensive counter air missions and offensive counter air operations in NATO terminology.

- ensuring the integration of air support (fires, intelligence, transport);
- sharing intelligence;
- ensuring smooth and responsive sharing of the vertical dimension;
- using the Air component to increase land forces' freedom of action, through its speed of commitment, range, and effects, especially to face unexpected threats and exploit tactical success.

Joint functional Air component

In the context of a comprehensive joint air campaign, the Force Commander entrusts the Commander, Joint Force Air Component (COMJFAC), with operational responsibility. The COMJFAC is the commander of the service component whose assets have a prevailing role in the comprehensive air campaign and has the necessary skills in terms of planning, scheduling and conduct of air operations. The COMJFAC most often comes from the Air Force.

This component of joint air forces (multinational if need be) or the Air component is said to be functional: It is tailor-made with assets from several components employed in a combined way.

2.2.3.2 Interactions between land and maritime forces (LCC/MCC)⁵⁰

Interaction between the two components takes place in littoral actions, especially amphibious operations.

The contribution of naval forces to air-land operations mainly includes:

- strategic transport by sea and from a home base for some land forces operating from the sea;
- protection, reconstitution and sustainment of land elements aboard ships and sustainment of parts of the forces landing on coastlines (supply, MEDEVACs);
- establishment of a joint fire support and intelligence base (carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft, ship-based helicopters, air defense in littoral areas, naval gunfire support and electronic warfare).

⁵⁰ References:

- DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – *Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces*.
- AJP 3.2 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, October 28, 2009 (under revision).

2.2.3.3 Interaction between land forces and Special Forces⁵¹

Special Forces are versatile and can interact with land forces:

- when committed **alone** in special operations likely to receive combat support or sustainment from Land component elements which then come under OPCON of the SF component. Special operations are conducted **under OPCON of the Commander, Joint Special Forces**, even when taking place in the area of operations of an operational or tactical commander;
- when acting **in direct support of the comprehensive maneuver**.
In that case, **Special Forces group can, for instance, be tasked with** supporting the joint maneuver at theater level. Special Forces are then committed in conventional operations, in combat support or sustainment of conventional forces, and come **under OPCON of the Force Commander**.

Particular attention must be paid constantly to the discretion of Special Forces actions, to support their operational security. They may come under OPCON of the Commander, Joint Special Forces, at any time, depending on strategic circumstances and priorities.

To facilitate coordination between land forces and Special Forces, the latter set up coordination cells in the LCC (Special Operations Command and Control Element – SOCCE) and appropriate CPs. A Special Operations Planning and Liaison Element (SOPL) is also set up by the Special Forces component in the Joint Theater Headquarters/Force HQ and with the Force Commander. Such liaison and coordination elements are essential to enable parallel planning, intelligence sharing and deconfliction in conduct.⁵²

Special Forces mainly contribute to air land operations through:

- provision of intelligence for the tactical level;
- participation in targeting and psychological operations;
- stealthy, quick operations with precision in the depth or non-assigned areas, against other threats, in a time-space framework and with different courses of action but, in return, with extensive preparation times and the necessary secrecy of special operations.

⁵¹ References:

- DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – *Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces*.
- AJP 3.2 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, October 28, 2009 (under revision).
- DIA 3.5 – *Special Operations Doctrine no. 917/DEF/EMAT/EMP.1/NP*, December 4, 2002 (under revision).

⁵² See the description of liaison elements on the diagram in Paragraph 234.

To conduct their operations, Special Forces usually require:

- intelligence on their possible areas of commitment;
- logistical support/sustainment;
- combat support: fires, tactical mobility, engineer support including counter-IED;
- reinforcement in aviation assets to supplement Special Forces helicopters;
- infantry-heavy combined arms support where their mission requires secure zone, cover, diversions, cordons or handover/relief.

2.2.3.4 Interactions between land forces and other government departments

As part of a comprehensive approach in overseas operations, and particularly within, the national territory, land forces may operate with units and points of contact in other government departments, particularly the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, which also participate in security and diplomacy. However, other government departments may be approached, such as the Ministry of Transport (railway station and airport security as part of the Vigipirate antiterrorist plan), the Ministry of Agriculture (working with the Water & Forest agency as part of the Héphaïstos plan against forest fires or for Operation Harpie in French Guiana), and the Ministry of Health (plans to counter large-scale pandemics). Players from the private sector are also involved, such as the SNCF⁵³ and the airports of Paris as part of the Vigipirate antiterrorist plan.

2.2.3.4.1 Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry of the Interior is usually the lead Ministry on the national territory. One of the key points is the coordination with its command structures – the Interagency Crisis Unit (*Cellule Interministérielle de Crise - CIC*), the Interagency Crisis Management Operations Center (*Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises de la DGSCGC*⁵⁴ – COGIC), the Prefects of Defense and Security zones, regional and *département* Prefects and their crisis units (especially the Interagency Headquarters of the Defense and Security Zone – *EMIZDS* and the *Département* Operations Center - COD).

In operations abroad, cooperation typically involves protection of French nationals, diplomatic compounds, and VIPs including ambassadors; asset coordination in the event of natural disasters, pandemics or industrial hazards; Security System Reform; security and defense cooperation; operational assistance missions with the security forces of crisis countries, intelligence-sharing, and one-off support actions for forensic services dealing with IEDs.

⁵³ *Société nationale des chemins de fer français*: French National Railway Company.

⁵⁴ *Direction générale de la sécurité civile et de la gestion des crises*: Directorate General of Civil Support and Crisis Management.

The main Ministry of the Interior services involved are the National Police, Civil Support units including firefighter units (fire and emergency services), and the Gendarmerie. Some civil support units (UIISC) and firefighters (BSPP⁵⁵) are partially manned by Army personnel, for employment by the Ministry of the Interior.

Interactions between land forces and the Gendarmerie⁵⁶

The Gendarmerie is a major security stakeholder cooperating with land forces abroad and on the national territory.

When the Gendarmerie executes military missions – i.e. when participating in armed forces operations abroad – it comes under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chief of Staff's operational command⁵⁷. In this context, the Gendarmerie can make a decisive contribution to the Force, especially through:

- expertise in criminal, forensic and **technical policing**;
- skills in **intelligence** and **law enforcement**;
- its role in **training and mentoring** local internal security forces, in line with the action of the Force in-theater, including Military Assistance.

Employing Gendarmerie forces helps free other components from long-term commitments in missions closer to public security operations than military action. Moreover, the Gendarmerie is always committed alongside joint forces in operations abroad in its **Gendarmerie Prévôtale (Military Police / Provosts) role⁵⁸**.

Land forces supporting the action of the Gendarmerie: Gendarmerie units deployed to a theater of operations have the ability to operate autonomously in the framework of the mission received. However, when mission conditions are degraded, the Gendarmerie needs combat support and sustainment from the Force.

⁵⁵ *Brigade de Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris.*

⁵⁶ References:

- *DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces.*
- *DIA-3.18 – Deployment of the National Gendarmerie in Overseas Operations* no. 126/DEF/CICDE/NP of July 10, 2013.

⁵⁷ See Act 2009-971 on the Gendarmerie, August 3, 2009.

⁵⁸ References:

- *DIA-3.18 (A) –Deployment of the National Gendarmerie in Overseas Operations* no. 126/DEF/CICDE/NP of July 10, 2013.
- *Ministry of Defense instructions for the Organization of Military Police/Provost Operations outside the National Territory in Peacetime*, no. 008164, July 26, 2013.
- *CDEF Study Report on the Relationship between the Land Forces and the Military Police/Provost in Overseas Operations outside the National Territory* (to be released in 2014).

The Gendarmerie supporting the land component: The role of Gendarmerie units must be integrated in joint operations planning. Interoperability enables the Gendarmerie to include its specific actions within a wider maneuver and thus provide tactical added value to joint command.

On the national territory, interactions with the Gendarmerie are even stronger. The land forces regularly operate in support of Gendarmerie or police missions in a very strict, legal manner, e.g. Operation Harpie against illegal gold washing in French Guiana, Operation Vigipirate against terrorism in major cities, etc. This is developed in Paragraph 3.2.

2.2.3.4.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Outside the national territory, when anticipating crises or in planning or execution phases, armed forces coordinate operations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This includes protecting French nationals, diplomatic compounds, and VIPs (including ambassadors), as well as security and defense cooperation [conducted structurally by the Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate (DCSD)⁵⁹ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], intelligence sharing, etc.

The main Ministry of Foreign Affairs players involved are ambassadors and their advisers, especially defense attachés and the defense cooperation chain.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is usually considered the lead agency for RESEVAC-NEO operations (as the decision to launch a NEO operation is up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the evacuation plan is also its responsibility) and hostage-rescue operations. Communication about these operations is conducted in particular by the Ministry.

2.2.3.5 Temporary Functional Components⁶⁰

For specific operations, it may be necessary to set up Temporary Functional Components. An **Amphibious Task Force** or **Airborne Task Force** may thus be created. The aim is usually to provide strategic mobility and support through maritime or air platforms to specialized ground combat elements.

⁵⁹ Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense (DCSD).

⁶⁰ References:

- DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces.
- AJP 3.2 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, October 28, 2009 (under revision).

2.2.3.5.1 Amphibious Task Force⁶¹

The aim of amphibious operations is to deliver ground combat forces using ships. They are characterized by definition of a temporary Amphibious Operations Area (AOA) in which the **Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF)**, is entrusted Land Component Commander authority.

These operations enable initial entry operations in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments and therefore facilitate setting up an air-land base. However, national capabilities restrict their deployment to un- or weakly defended coasts. Amphibious operations must usually be conducted under air and naval protection with prior shaping actions (neutralization of enemy defenses and mines, intelligence collection, etc.).

Apart from the conventional employment of landing troops, amphibious capabilities enable a series of actions:

- raids from the sea, on the coast or in the depths;
- operational transport to a port or safe beach;
- humanitarian missions on the coastline;
- ship support to forces that have already landed.

2.2.3.5.2 Airborne Task Force⁶²

The projection of troops sometimes requires them to be transported as close as possible to the engagement zone. Military aircraft carry them along with their equipment to the core of crisis zones. Their courses of action include air assault (seizing key points and areas difficult to reach from airport infrastructure) and airdrops, usually to points located in hostile territory, often because airport infrastructure is unavailable.

61 References:

- DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces.
 - PIA 3.1.1.1 – *Amphibious Operations*, January 2013.
 - PIA 3.1.1 – *Organization of Amphibious Operations*, no. 563/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP, June 11, 2010.
 - PIA 3.1.1.2 – *Manual on the Preventive Deployment of an Amphibious Group aboard a LTD or a Command Assault Ship*, no. 294/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/DR (Restricted), March 27, 2009.

62 References:

- DIA 3.2.1 – *Airborne Operations*, no. 331/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP, May 27, 2008 (under revision).
- PIA 3.2.1.1 – *Joint Field Manual on Landing Airborne Troops* no. D-13-004387/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP, April 10, 2013.

The operational capabilities of landed units contribute to tactical surprise, as long as they receive ad hoc logistic support.

A Combined Airborne Task Force may be formed in a multinational context. The Commander, Combined Airborne Task Force, ensures tactical command (TACOM) over the available assets and reinforcement forces for the airborne operation, consequently planning and conducting the operation and reporting to the Force Commander.

2.2.3.6 Interactions between land forces and joint domains

Joint doctrine identifies other joint domains enabling or supporting a campaign, namely logistics⁶³, engineering⁶⁴, management of airspace⁶⁵, military police, air defense⁶⁶, intelligence⁶⁷, CIS⁶⁸, CBRN defense⁶⁹, and MIO⁷⁰ (engagement/ actions shaping perceptions and the operational environment: civil-military cooperation, information operations or psychological actions, media operations). All these activities must be integrated into air-land operations. As land forces are key players in civil-military cooperation and sustainment, only these two points will be detailed.

2.2.3.6.1 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civilian Affairs Operations (CAO)⁷¹

“CIMIC is a function designed to contribute to Force integration in the human environment in order to facilitate conduct of its mission, restore a normal security situation and enable crisis handling by civilian authorities (government departments, humanitarian action, economic recovery, etc.).”⁷²

63 DIA 4b – Sustainment Doctrine, no. 040/DEF/CICDE/NP, March 14, 2013.

64 DIA 3.12 – Military Engineer Support to Joint Operations no. 153/DEF/CICDE/NP, 23 June, 2014.

65 DIA 3.3.5 – Airspace Control, no. 140/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 18, 2013.

66 DIA 3.3.4 – Air Defense, no. 089/DEF/CICDE/NP, June 17, 2013.

67 DIA 2 – Military-related Intelligence and Counterinsurgency no. 240/DEF/CICDE/NP, October 7, 2010.

68 DIA 6 – Communication and information systems (CIS) in operations, no.147/DEF/CICDE/NP, June 24, 2014.

69 DIA 3.8 (A) – CBRN, no. 015/DEF/CICDE/DR, January 11, 2012.

70 DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces, “All the capabilities of a force contribute to the Info Ops process. Among these, some operate in non-lethal ways: special influence actions of the Special Operations Command (SOC), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Key Leader Engagement (KLE), MIO/ Psychological Operations (PsyOp) etc. In France, they are referred to as actions on perceptions and the operational environment (APEO – Actions sur les perceptions et l’environnement opérationnel)” (page 56 EV).

DIA 3.10 – Information Operations, no. 143/DEF/CICDE/DR, June 23, 2014 and DIA 3.10.1 – Military Influence Operations, no. 069/DEF/CICDE/NP, March 5, 2008.

71 References:

- AJP 3.2 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, October 28, 2009 (under revision).

- DIA 3.10.3 (A) – Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), no. 174/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 17, 2012.

72 Definition in DIA 3.10.3 (A) CIMIC no. 174/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 17, 2012.

CIMIC is central to the crisis management process. However, it should not be mistaken for the comprehensive approach, even if it does make an essential contribution to the security area. Its area of action directly contributes to land forces' action, especially during stabilization and normalization.

CIMIC supplements programs long-term and primarily involves practical measures visible to populations in the short and medium term. Its four objectives contribute to achieving the desired end state:

- reinforcing military action;
- contributing to coherent actions in-theater;
- accelerating crisis recovery;
- contributing to promoting French influence.

2.2.3.6.2 Joint sustainment

By its very nature, sustainment is conducted in a joint environment. However, each service operates in a particular context with specific constraints, leading to shared responsibilities. Land force sustainment is carried out by specialized functional chains that are highly skilled in their areas. These joint agencies enable us to meet requirements in different areas.⁷³

The deployment of the joint sustainment chains in the theater of operation is task-organized in sustainment groups (GS) located at operational and tactical levels. The operational sustainment echelon is the Joint Theater Sustainment Group (*Groupement de Soutien Interarmées de Théâtre - GSIAT*⁷⁴), under the Joint Sustainment Assistant Commander (*Adjoint Soutien InterArmées – ASIA*), located at either Force HQ (for national operations) or the National Contingent Commander (NCC) (for coalition operations). GSs implement and coordinate sustainment pertaining to functional areas, from theater entry to *GTIAs*.

Land forces logistical units, including Transportation, Materiel, Field Services and Medical battalions, support this joint disposition by manning the key nucleus of the sustainment groups and their CPs.

73 DIA 4 – *Sustainment Doctrine*, no. 040/DEF/CICDE/NP, March 14, 2013.

74 DIA 4.6 on the *Joint Theater Sustainment Group (GSIAT)*, January 30, 2015.

2.3 Integrating a Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) into joint operations

Land forces are organically organized in headquarters and units (Rapid Reaction Corps, Force HQs, brigades, *régiments*/ battalions, companies, etc.) whose role is to man the key nucleus staffs of the CPs and combined arms units (*GTIAs*, *SGTIAs*/company teams, etc.) deployed in operations.

A land force always comes under a Joint Force Commander with a joint HQ at their disposal.

Units belonging to the land component comprise the level of implementation and execution of air-land operations. Their organization depends on the size of the Force deployed and the evolution of the political and military situation.

A land component is characterized by levels of command expressing operational roles in-theater.

2.3.1 Force Command

Acting at operational level, the Force Command's role is to plan the campaign and conduct and coordinate force action in the entire joint operations area (JOA). Command is exercised by a Joint Theater HQ (JTHQ).

2.3.2 Land Component Command (LCC)

The LCC is responsible at **tactical level**.

As regards its functions and organization, the Land Component Command executes the orders received from operational level by planning the operations of its forces in its entire area of operations, sometimes smaller than the joint operations area. It:

- plans for the entire campaign;
- contributes to operational planning in close cooperation with Joint Force Command;
- is the highest level of conduct for tactical ground activities;
- is responsible for tactical synchronization of operations when supported commander;
- includes specific functions given in reinforcements not always found in its subordinate units: legal and political advisors; campaign planning; coordination of national intelligence activities; targeting; operations shaping perceptions and the operational environment; media operations.

When the operation has a prevailing air-land component with limited contributions from other service components, the Joint HQ⁷⁵ may be established with key nucleus staff from land forces, reinforced by the other services, directorates and agencies.

Lessons learned and national and NATO doctrines show that, under specific circumstances, a given HQ may assume both operational and tactical responsibilities.⁷⁶

2.3.3 Command of land tactical units

History recalls large-scale military formations, such as Armies Group, Army, Corps, Division, and Brigade. Only the last three remain in the doctrine of land forces in operations. The brigade is the only organic standing formation left.⁷⁷

Recent operations show that Brigade CPs are very often used as key nucleus staffs, reinforced with planning, intelligence, and logistics elements as well as elements pertaining to actions shaping perceptions and the operational environment.

To express the roles of these major units in the comprehensive chain of an engagement, the scale of command levels is as follows:

Level 1 – Role of a Corps

It plans and conducts the battle or comprehensive campaign in the entire area of operations and for the duration of the mission; it implements all warfighting functions in a disposition nearly always non-linear and controls rear areas.

At NATO, the Corps is responsible for arming a JTFHQ-L⁷⁸, tactical operational CP in the theater in a land-dominant operation. This capacity is included in the operational contract of the French Rapid Reaction corps (*CRR-FR*). This contract came of that defined by the French White Paper on Defense and National Security, operational contracts (page 86 EV).

⁷⁵ See *PIA 7.0 List of Generic Modules of Joint Forces*, no. D-13-004791/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/NP, April 19, 2013.

⁷⁶ See *DIA 3*, no. 15/DEF/CICDE/DR, June 25, 2014, p.28: Tactical-level HQs may, on a case-by-case basis, be appointed to exercise operational responsibilities for a given operation. It is imperative that they have available the functions to hold the above required capabilities at operational level. These abilities should be acquired, duly certified and reinforced by the functions necessary to the exercise of responsibilities.

⁷⁷ Combined Arms brigade composed of a HQ, combat and combat support *regiments/battalions*.

⁷⁸ JTFHQ-L: Joint Task Force Headquarters – Land, (NATO Reference : Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations (CFAO), 11/02/2014).

Level 2 – Role of a Division⁷⁹

The division plans and conducts the maneuver, combat support and sustainment in order to accomplish a single mission in a usually linear disposition.

At NATO, the division is the key element of MJO⁸⁰ and SJO which appear in the operational contract of the French Army. This contract came of that defined by the French White Paper on Defense and National Security, operational contracts (page 86 EV).

Level 3 – Role of a Brigade⁸¹

The brigade designs, conducts close combat and coordinates combat support usually in order to accomplish a tactical mission in one direction or in a specific area and in a linear disposition.

79 Definition of a “division”:

A major organic or operational unit task-organized in several combined arms brigades it commands, supports and sustains by its divisional command, combat support and sustainment elements.

NB: As a component of a level 1 or 2 HQ, the division is organized in several sections.

EMP 60.641: French-English Glossary (Army), January 28, 2013.

80 Major Joint Operation and Smaller Joint Operation (Reference NATO: Level of Ambition – NATO, “The DJSE Concept”, <http://www.nato.int/fchd/issues/DJSE.html> (15/07/2011)).

81 Definition of a “brigade”:


A permanent structure dedicated to operations, composed of a HQ and units regrouped in the context of a specific branch (heavy/light armor, mechanized, specialized infantry, and aviation). It is meant to set up the key nucleus of a maneuver brigade. In operations, the brigade is the basic combined arms major unit, tasked with conducting contact actions (close combat and relationships with the environment) and coordinating combat support actions in its area of operations. As a major contingency unit, it is established on request around a hard core to accomplish a specific tactical mission. Its size may vary from 2,000 to 6,000 troops; it may be engaged:

- a) in a land operational force, under national or multinational command, and subordinated to a division or Joint Force;
- b) as a land operational force, under national command. In any case, brigades implement only warfighting functions needed for mission success and have no organic sustainment capabilities.

EMP 60.641: French-English Glossary (Army), January 28, 2013.

2.3.4 Liaison elements

Land liaison elements are integrated at different joint command chain levels, as in the diagram below:



ACRONYMS :

JFC : Joint Force Commander
CJFLCC : Combined Joint Force Land Component Command
CJFACC : Combined Joint Force air Component Command
CJFMCC : Combined Joint Force maritime Component Command
CJSOCC : Combined Joint Force special operations Component Command
CAOC : Combined air operations Center

MAOC : Maritime Operations Center
ALE : Air Liaison Element
MLE : Maritime Liaison Element
SOLE : Special Operation Liaison Element
ALO : Air Liaison Officer
LLO : Land Liaison Officer
TF : Task Force
TG : Task Group
SOCCE : Special Operation Command and Control Element (AJP 3.5 and AAP 6)
SOPL : Special Operation Planning and Liaison Element

2.3.5 Intelligence and integration in the targeting process

“Intelligence plays a central role in the knowledge and anticipation function. It irrigates each of the other strategic functions of our defence and national security strategy. It must be used both to guide political and strategic decision-making and to plan and conduct operations on the tactical level.” (French White Paper on Defense and National Security, 2013)

Intelligence of military interest contributes to constant appraisal of risks and threats and ultimately aims to provide the basis for autonomous assessment and decision-making as well as support to operational commitments of all kinds, not to forget force protection at strategic, operational and tactical levels. It also has a strong joint character (joint intelligence function) down to tactical level.

Exploiting information gathered by specialized sensors, including air-land sensors, enables us to advise decision-makers once analysis is completed.

Land forces contribute to permanent strategic watch and also to intelligence support for pre-decision planning.

Land forces, with their deployed assets, are a major contributor to the joint intelligence function in operations. Conversely, intelligence from higher levels and other service components complements the understanding of tactical levels.

Intelligence is a priority to understand, act and assess complex crisis situations.

In current and foreseeable engagements, greater use is made of intelligence for force protection, in particular in countering IEDs.

As with intelligence, service components participate in the **targeting** process by developing it at their level through implementing their own lethal, less lethal and non-lethal operational capabilities, throughout the continuum of operations.

On the national territory, the national intelligence disposition is interagency and the Ministry of the Interior plays a major role. However, the land forces participate in general security operations, in the framework of established interagency regulations (*Vigipirate* plan) or when requisitioned under a governmental or judicial procedure.

Within the defined legal scope of the rules of employment and engagement defined according to the nature of missions, it falls naturally to land forces to contribute to situational awareness.

2.3.6 Coordinating operators in the third dimension⁸²

Land forces operations are fully integrated into joint operations conducted in or through the third dimension. This is why they participate in coordinating all operators in the vertical maneuver.

The “3D support” cells of the land component, located at every level of command structures, are therefore responsible for two main functions:

- integrating and coordinating joint fire support⁸³ for the air-land tactical maneuver;
- coordinating in the third dimension the operators acting in the land forces' area of engagement.

The vertical maneuver, the employment of fires and drones is developing constantly in inter-surface areas and fully expresses this permanent interaction between air-land and air environments while ensuring coherence, effectiveness and security.

⁸² References:

- AJP 3.3 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations*, January 2013.
- DIA 3.3.5 – *Airspace Control*, no. 140/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 18, 2013.
- DIA 3.3.4 – *Ground-to-Air Defense*, no. 089/DEF/CICDE/NP, June 17, 2013.
- DIA 3.3.2 – *Air Support* no. 798/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP, July 25, 2006 (under revision).

⁸³ **DIA 3.3.2 : French supplement to AJP-3.3.2(A) “Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction” no. 154/DEF/CICDE/NP, 27 June 2014.**

CHAPTER 3

THE LAND FORCES IN CRISIS SETTLEMENT

“ The French armed forces must be able to intervene in three types of operations in these regions:

- operations conducted on an autonomous basis, such as evacuation of French or European nationals, counter-terrorism operations or response to attacks;*
- operations as part of a coalition – in the framework of the European Union, an established alliance such as NATO or on an ad hoc basis – in which France may take the initiative and command or in which it will exercise a dominant influence;*
- operations as part of a coalition in which France will make a contribution, but where command is entrusted to an allied nation, most commonly the United States.”⁸⁴*

“ Protecting the national territory, our fellow citizens and the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions are core to our defence and national security strategy. The armed forces are responsible for permanently ensuring the security of the territory, its air space and its maritime approaches [...] In the event of a major crisis, the armed forces can deploy up to 10,000 personnel from the land forces in support of interior security and civilian security forces, together with appropriate resources provided by the sea and air forces.”⁸⁵

⁸⁴ French White Paper on Defense and National Security, May 2013, page 80 (EV).

⁸⁵ Ibid, (page 126 EV).

In order to express the contributions of the land forces to joint operations concisely and precisely, two types of engagement have been selected:

- participation in national or multinational expeditionary campaigns, including NEOs (non-combatant evacuation operation);
- participating in a deployment on the national territory.


Land forces can conduct several types of operations simultaneously.

3.1 National and multinational expeditionary operations

“Our forces must have the capability to engage in a major coercive operation.”⁸⁶

The scale of land forces’ engagement is most easily gauged from the capacities committed. These operations always require a high level of **interoperability** as well as a proven **ability to adapt** to changes in tempo and objectives.

The diagram below depicts the evolution of this type of operation:



Source: CDEF, from FT 01


⁸⁶ Ibid, (page 88 EV).

3.1.1 Command and control

The White Paper on Defense and National Security stresses that *“In the framework of a major engagement, notably within NATO, the armed forces will preserve the capacity to set up command structures for land, sea and air forces at army corps level or equivalent.”*⁸⁷

The extreme diversity of crises in which the French armed forces are committed now requires an evolving and modular command system that must be capable of adapting constantly to the type of engagement as well as to changing situations.

The land component operates in this context, as shown in the diagram below:⁸⁸



Source: DIA 3

- | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| OPCOM | | 1. French representation | | 3. Autonomous situation assessment | |
| OPCON | | 2. Compliance for employment of FR forces | | 4. Employment of national resources | |
| FR national control | | | | | |

87 French White Paper on Defense and National Security, May 2013, (page 89 EV).

88 DIA 3(A) CEO (2014) Command of Operational Engagements, no. 151/DEF/CICDE/DR, June 25, 2014.

Coherent command support capabilities:

The “command support” function includes all deployable human and equipment capabilities enabling authorities to command and headquarters to operate and communicate in an expeditionary context.

Command support includes two components: Command and Information Systems (CIS/ SIC) and HQ Support. Cybersecurity is an integral part of CIS and C2 structures. For an information system, cybersecurity is the state which allows resistance to events resulting from cyberspace and prone to compromising the availability, integrity or confidentiality of data stored, processed or transmitted.⁸⁹

The CIS component is the deployable telecommunications operator of the land force. It deploys operational information systems and communications networks and ensures their interconnection with the networks of other components. CIS also interconnect networks at operational and strategic levels, in the joint approach of “end-to-end” connections.

As such, it is prepared for deployment of all or part of the CIS of the following entities:

- pre-identified OHQ;⁹⁰
- joint alert modules (including the National Emergency Echelon and Theater Liaison and Reconnaissance Elements⁹¹);
- operational-level CP systems;
- French national control chain (in the case of a multinational operation);
- national logistics chain.

The HQ support component complements the CIS function.

It supports facilities and field services, and protects CPs where the CIS component is deployed.

3.1.2 Intervention – Shaping the area of operations

This phase usually marks the beginning of an operation. It aims to create the right conditions for the success of decisive operations.

89 DIA-3.40_CYBER(2014), *Cyberdefense*, no. 82/DEF/CICDE/DR, 18 March 2014 and Study Report on cyber conflict in joint operations – approved on July 17, 2014 under no. 500897/DEF/CDEF/DDo/B.CDT RENS.

90 In France, e.g. from the Mt Valérien station.

91 National Emergency Echelon: *Echelon National d'Urgence (ENU)* and Liaison and Intelligence Element: *Elément de Liaison et de Reconnaissance (ELRT)*.

In order to shape the battlespace before committing ground forces and preserve freedom of action, air superiority needs to be achieved and maintained: a decisive run-up to any air-land operation.

Participation of the land forces in shaping the battlespace⁹²

Although air and special operations components are usually committed, land forces also contribute to this phase.

Shaping the battlespace involves collecting intelligence and preparing the terrain and pressurizing the enemy prior to launching decisive operations by integrating all actions to enhance efficiency, including shows of force, limited attacks, CP warfare, mobility/countermobility, deception, and targeting with air-land fires.

Shaping the battlespace begins with Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.⁹³ It contributes to identifying the enemy's main effort and enables identification of high-added-value targets. It also allows prioritizing and sequencing of employment of intelligence-collection assets to detect and monitor targets. It also helps select the unit best suited to achieving the desired effect.

In a joint maneuver, sequencing, operation tempo and simultaneity of actions aim to disorganize and overwhelm the enemy, gain a moral advantage and achieve concentration of efforts for the following phase.

Favorable conditions must also be created to benefit from the operational environment.

Shaping the battlespace is facilitated by real-time information sharing. This process aims to fully exploit communications technologies in order to accurately isolate, identify and monitor enemy forces, process multiple sources of information, and use adequate force. Immediate and precise battle damage assessment facilitates redeployment of forces.

3.1.3 Intervention – Decisive operations

3.1.3.1 Framework nation, lead nation and initial entry

The notion of the “framework nation” enables us to measure the credibility and coherence of the will and military capabilities of a State. Initial entry capability can be seen as an attribute of the framework nation in an operation.

92 AJP 3.2 – *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, October 28, 2009: Shaping the Joint Battlespace, (page 65 § 424).

93 RENS 20.001: The Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment is an analytical process led by the G2.

Framework Nation:⁹⁴

This volunteer nation has received a political or military mandate to assume command responsibility at strategic, operational or tactical level. It provides the command structure of the given level and, in principle, the most significant volume of forces compared to those deployed.⁹⁵

Being Framework Nation therefore involves:

- commanding an operation by taking into account all dimensions (allied, joint, operational), and therefore deploying an operational-level CP;
- committing the most troops and so deploying corresponding tactical command capacities;
- being prepared to compensate for any lack of capacity putting the operation at risk, and so being able to provide ad hoc specific capabilities (Army Aviation, logistics, etc.).

Lead Nation:

France can have a lead nation role in one or several domains. In that case, it assumes responsibility for procuring and providing resources allocated to these particular domains to all or part of the multinational force. It may also assume responsibility for providing and coordinating logistics assets in support of other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility.

Should France's participation in a multinational engagement take the shape of a national component, the Commander of the national component is responsible for operational employment of the component within strict limits determined by the Joint Chief of Staff, who gives personal instructions.

Initial entry:⁹⁶

The Concept Paper prepared by the CICDE (Joint Forces Center for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation) on "initial entry" proposes the following generic definition: *"A series of joint force and power projection operations, on, close to or above a foreign or*

⁹⁴ DIA – 01(A): "France may be appointed as the framework nation of a coalition: if so, it has to provide the ad hoc command structure and, usually, the most contingent with regard to the volume of engaged forces. The planning and conduct of the operation are executed according to the current methods of the French Armed Forces, via the national CIS" (page 35 EV).

⁹⁵ PIA-7.2., Paragraph 6-3.

⁹⁶ RDIA-2014/002 Initial Entry no. 85/DEF/CICDE/NP, April 1 2014 and the part on land forces (to be released in 2015). DIA-01(A), p.40: Highly challenging access to physical environments and immaterial fields requires a strong military engagement with crucial entry capabilities.

*occupied territory, of limited duration, against a more or less marked armed opposition or in an area difficult to access, with or without prior agreement of local authorities. This action aims to secure an area of interest in a non-permissive environment in order to establish a disposition from which more numerous forces may operate to complete subsequent operations.*⁹⁷

The notion of “initial entry” includes preliminary securing of entry points [Air Point of Debarkation (APOD) or Sea Point of Debarkation (SPOD)] in order to enable conduct of decisive initial operations.

NATO underlines that they are “*joint operations conducted to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces in a joint operations area, either in a permissive or a non-permissive environment.*”⁹⁸

Initial entry therefore implies at least:

- securing of entry points, and then an area in-theater;
- being prepared to receive forces, and so command, intelligence, aviation, dismounted and mounted combat, engineer and logistics capabilities.

In a non-permissive environment, initial entry will require further coercion capabilities (electronic warfare, fires, air defense, etc.).

The main missions during this phase are:

- Force deployment;
- widening of the bridgehead;
- liaising with other forces;
- securing the bridgehead by extending the security area;
- fighting to engage the enemy during offensive operations;
- command support.

Force protection is of paramount importance. Initial entry forces must be protected against numerous threats, including CBRN, ballistic missile strikes, and terrorism.

97 Concept Paper prepared by the CICDE, June 2013.

98 RDIA-2014/002 *Initial Entry* no.85/DEF/CICDE/NP, April 1, 2014

3.1.3.2 Coercion operations

Offensive and defensive course of action:

Gaining the advantage – Preparing the maneuver

This phase aims to control the environment and increase enemy uncertainty in a view to launching a decisive action and then exploiting the results. Gaining the advantage prepares the upcoming tactical action. Integrating joint capabilities, in the areas of intelligence and fire support in particular, is of paramount importance and requires great coordination.

Achieving effects – Effort and consolidation

Once the advantage has been gained, the Force must maneuver in the field by applying the principle of concentration of efforts linked to surprise⁹⁹ in order to directly act on the adversary or the environment, with the aim of achieving the main effect¹⁰⁰.

This objective is achieved in three stages:

Tactical movement

This aims to place the forces in appropriate locations chosen to strike the adversary at a decisive point or avoid enemy attacks. It requires controlling the environment, because the latter determines routes and timeframes, impacts on security, sustainment, mobility, and communications, and influences morale.

Shock and fire

These decisive actions aim to seize an objective or make the enemy ineffective. Also favoring surprise, the three elements – shock, fire and movement – must result in breaking enemy tempo and will. It requires control of the relative combat power, which must be analyzed and then refined during the initial phase. Superiority must be achieved at the right place and time.

Exploitation

The aim is to capitalize on the effects of shock and fire and broaden their scope while complying with the commander's intent and objectives. Forces must go beyond the assigned mission to exploit all opportunities that came to light during the preceding stage.

Right from the start, this phase must be supported by all recon assets in order to identify the adversary's limitations and weaknesses.

⁹⁹ DIA-01(A): "Environment " is here to be understood as the physical, human, political and economic space" (page 60 EV).

¹⁰⁰ EMP 60.641 – ex TTA 106: "main effect: Condition which ensures the success of the mission. It expresses the effects intended upon the adversary or the environment at a given time and place".

LIBYA: OPERATION HARMATTAN, 2011

From March to October, 2011, French Army Aviation was integrated into Combined Task Force 473 and participated in Operation Harmattan in a NATO-led coalition against Libyan governmental forces. After a very short buildup (14 days), the two successive GAMs – Helicopter Strike Groups (HSGs) – (Tigre, Gazelle and Puma helicopters) led pinpoint strikes in areas of action limited both in time and space. Decentralized command, autonomous aircrews, and well-rehearsed procedures, especially for night flying, made a real difference: In 41 sorties, GAMs contributed to 40% of the destructions achieved by the French forces, without no collateral damage or friendly losses.

Success was based on optimal integration in a highly-complex air-sea disposition (naval gunfire support from frigates; intelligence support from ATL-2 aircraft, reconnaissance Rafale fighters, nuclear attack submarines, US drones and support and protection from air defense ships...), first-rate coordination with the command assault ship, and, above all, field-testing aérocombat¹⁰¹ (Army aviation combat) doctrine.

The operation highlighted the added-value of aérocombat, particularly as regards certain allied forces that limited employment of their own helicopters to a single course of action – deliberate targeting.

3.1.3.3 Separate emergency operations: The case of non-combatant evacuation operations – RESEVAC (NEO)¹⁰²

The 2013 White Paper underlined that the armed forces must be prepared to conduct separate operations, in particular non-combatant evacuations of French and European nationals.

Apart from the specific national character of the command structure, land forces implement the same courses of action as for the operations described in this chapter.

¹⁰¹ *Aérocombat*: in which tactical aviation units (AAvn battalion task forces and company teams) are organized with flexibility, mainly into AAvn-heavy combined arms battalion task forces and company teams. *Aérocombat* is defined as employment of AAvn units, in combination with other combined arms components – mainly of the contact function – or independently, often in a joint context. Integrated into the combined arms action from the planning phase, these units contribute their specific qualities, based on surprise, in order to increase the operational commander's freedom of action. Capable of performing autonomous actions, they bring Army tactical action into the depth while limiting the footprint on the ground.

¹⁰² DIA 3.4.2 – *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)*, no. 136/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 2, 2009.

“An evacuation operation usually occurs within the context of an internal crisis within the HN. In such an unpredictable environment, the situation is likely to suddenly deteriorate at the local level and endanger more or less directly the security of non-combatants. Moreover, the smooth execution of the operation may be compromised by the behavior of local actors (hostility or direct opposition to the evacuation) [...] A NEO usually occurs in a destabilized country unable to ensure the security of foreign nationals any longer.”¹⁰³

A Joint Command Post can control the operation at theater political and military level (liaisons with diplomatic and consular services, local government authorities, factions, IOs/NGOs, multinational allied forces). This Joint CP leads and coordinates the action of the various components and fulfils theater-level functions (operational information and communication).

Most of the time, the launching of this type of operation is conducted as a matter of emergency. There is limited time available to shape the area of operation in order to limit the risk of hostages being taken.

Protection, support and evacuation capabilities for the entitled persons need to be provided as quickly as possible.

Prepositioned land forces should be well-acclimatized, trained and available at short notice. They can then seize a point of entry immediately (SPOD/APOD), often previously reconned and offering logistical facilities for non-combatants (housing, food supplies, health services, etc.). Depending on the situation, the forces may have to secure insertion points and implement a security disposition while evacuating entitled persons in armored vehicles or by helitransport. They may even have to conduct offensive actions, such as seizing key points, extracting authorities and isolated persons etc.

Prior to evacuation, to protect entitled persons and possibly extract isolated persons, the troops committed may have to resort to crowd-control actions.

The Force is responsible for the primary evacuation, assuming responsibility for the entitled persons at the assembly points. The Force transfers or escorts the entitled persons to the evacuation points during primary evacuation, and from there they proceed to the Evacuation Control Centre.

When entitled persons cannot proceed to the assembly points alone, due to the long distances to cover, isolation, or the risk of being taken hostage etc., the Force may have to conduct one-off recovery or extraction operations.

103 DIA 3.4.2.

Côte d'Ivoire: Operation LICORNE, 2004

In November, 2004, in the context of the worsening security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, France decided to facilitate voluntary departures, without going so far as to order the evacuation of non-combatants. Within a week, more than 8,000 entitled persons, including 5,900 French nationals, left the country in a non-permissive environment. In that context, 1,300 extractions (recovering trapped entitled persons who could not proceed to evacuation plan assembly points) were conducted, for the most part in Abidjan, a city of more than 3 million inhabitants.

The main success factors were the following:

- there had been a French joint disposition in Côte d'Ivoire for several years and the theater was well-known thanks to defense cooperation and forces prepositioned in the country since 1960;*
- close cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, whose local players (Embassy, defense attaché, etc.) had prepared the evacuation plan;*
- first-class coordination with armed forces from 14 countries that sent evacuation means for their nationals;*
- recognized control of the physical environment (urban, bush, forest, and lagoon areas) and the combination of land warfighting functions in a joint and combined arms maneuver;*
- use of helicopters to destroy Ivorian SU-25 aircraft and MI-24 helicopters after air strikes on the French Bouaké GTIA, to conduct numerous extractions, and to provide combat support to road evacuation convoys;*
- the skills of the Special Forces in extraction and their first-rate coordination with the land forces.*

Few nations have the capacity to conduct such sensitive and complex operations, often as a matter of emergency, in a joint, allied and interagency environment. Our armed forces therefore have a leading reputation in the area.

3.1.4 Long-term stabilization or crisis-management operations

Stabilizing a theater requires action in the areas of security, governance and development, which French and international armed forces cannot do alone. Military intervention systematically takes place in a complex environment involving a great number of civilian and military actors.¹⁰⁴

Security aims to provide a **stable, safe** environment, particularly for civilian organizations and populations.

In the intervention phase, it focuses primarily on areas where no combat is taking place. During the stabilization phase, security is the **major** component of the action.

Like “conventional” tactical patterns, security complies with the need to gain the advantage – through **influence** and **control** – and achieve effects using **dissuasive pressure**.

- Preparation / Gaining the advantage

Gaining the advantage is aimed at the population, implementing a series of actions enabling us to avoid any destabilization. Land forces participate by ensuring security and public order.

- Effort

Freedom of action gained by influence and control then allows us to achieve local coercion effects, preventing, containing or eradicating a surge of violence. The security force must eventually be prepared to exert dissuasive pressure to restore a compromised situation.

- Consolidation

This means gaining local benefits from weakening enemy military capabilities and the resulting moral advantage, in order to rally the population and thus affect the “organization” that supplies and informs the adversary and keeps their morale up.

This objective requires denying the adversary the advantage provided by the terrain by forcing them to be increasingly mobile, thereby losing popular support by implementing political and economic measures. They must be completed or facilitated through environment-shaping actions by the forces.

¹⁰⁴ General (Army) Pierre de Villiers, Vice Joint Chief of Staff, in RDIA 2011/001 *Comprehensive Approach in Managing Crisis outside the National Territory* no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP, January 24, 2011.

AFGHANISTAN: Operation SHAMSHIR, 2011

From July 1-11, 2011, in order to weaken Taliban groups in the Alasay valley, the two GTIAs of Brigade Task Force Lafayette, together with two ANA battalions and Afghan police forces, controlled a difficult, mountainous and inhabited area covering 300 km².

In a joint and allied environment, they were provided with all the brigade's combat support elements, including the helicopter battalion, multi-sensor intelligence battalion and elements shaping perceptions and the environment, as well as ISAF assets from Regional Command-East (helicopters, US drones, fighter-bombers).

The GTIAs gradually seized terrain from an enemy estimated at 300 fighters that were combat-seasoned, undefeated for several years, well-organized and disseminated in the population and the mountains. GTIAs then conducted targeted destruction and area control operations.

According to counterinsurgency principles, the mission's main objective was to occupy the ground for ten consecutive days in a region hotly contested by the Taliban.

There were numerous clashes with insurgents trying to intermingle.

The enduring and continuous employment of French and Afghan forces, fighting side by side, eventually enabled us to neutralize fifty insurgents or so, dismantling caches and gathering actionable intelligence for further operations. There were eight lightly wounded on the friendly side (one VAB vehicle hit by a RPG-7 rocket). Ultimately, the insurrection was temporarily weakened and Afghan regular forces gained confidence and autonomy.

Security requires:

- **control of violence and limiting of collateral damage** by striking only direct and identified warfighters, excluding their human environment, necessitating coordination down to the lowest echelons;
- **sufficient troops**, because although conventional forces might be defeated by smaller, high-tech forces, it would be unrealistic to attempt controlling a populated area without the capacity to patrol it, or even saturate and occupy it at least partially;
- **coordination of the action of all service components**, as well as other government departments, international and non-governmental organizations, and local structures;
- **emphasis on training and capacity building** for local security and armed forces, which are key to solving the crisis;
- **assurance of normalization** by participating in the revival of the city. Although the major part of the problems arising from adversaries is more like policing than traditional military work, the land forces must be ready to operate as such, at least while replacement political and governmental structures are built up in mentoring situations;
- **sustainment of the campaign**, in liaison with the various directorates and services dealing with joint sustainment;
- sometimes, **equipping** of local, or even multinational forces;
- **communication**.

3.1.5 Normalization

3.1.5.1 The "Assistance" tactical pattern

Military assistance¹⁰⁵

This is designed before, during and after the intervention phase. It includes training local defense and security forces and helping them in operational commitments, especially by providing them with capabilities they do not have (e.g. Épidote detachment, OMLT and POMLT in Afghanistan, among other theaters).

¹⁰⁵ References:

- *DIA 3.4.5.1 – Military Assistance to a Foreign Force (AMO)*, no. 009/DEF/CICDE/NP, January 4, 2011.
- *EMP 20.370 – Contribution of the Land Forces to Military Assistance*, no. 500381/DEF/CDEF/DDO/B.ENG-IA/DR-SF, April 1, 2014.

Committing Gendarmerie forces is considered necessary for training and mentoring of local police forces to successfully resolve the crisis.

Humanitarian assistance¹⁰⁶

This includes facilitating the work of humanitarian aid agencies and public authorities, or even acting as a substitute for them and contributing to reestablishment of normal living conditions.

Assistance falls within the scope of land safeguarding or deployment operations, or can even be the very goal of the operation.

Assistance entails:

- **helping populations** suffering from conflict or natural or technological disasters, and **ensuring their security**;
- **participating in the reconstruction** of the State and **helping local authorities**;
- **providing assistance** by covering the essential needs of destitute populations. Although these tasks lie in the first place with public authorities and humanitarian agencies, specific conditions may require military means;
- **communicating** in order to:
 - deny spontaneous or ill-founded rumors;
 - communicate on the conditions of relief operations;
 - ensure favorable perceptions of the assistance force's efforts.

3.1.6 Disengagement¹⁰⁷

Disengagement is a joint national operation, mainly dealing with logistics, involving repatriation of deployed forces and, if necessary, returning facilities. Doing so requires use of specific expertise (environmental protection, legal aspects of property transfers).

This logistical maneuver, designed centrally by the Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center (CPCO) but with decentralized conduct and execution, requires appropriate protection and intervention capability to be maintained.

106 Reference: *DIA 3.4.3.1 – Emergency Relief Interventions outside the National Territory* no. 11/DEF/CICDE/NP, November 14, 2013.

107 Please refer to *DIA 4.2.1 - Disengagement*, no. 199/DEF/CICDE/NP, November 25, 2013.

The Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center is responsible for designing and controlling the disengagement, which is conducted by the Joint Center for the Conduct of Operational Logistics¹⁰⁸. The Multimodal Transport Center¹⁰⁹ and Force CP ensure in-theater implementation. A disengagement operation center may be set up once the environment has been secured in order to clear accounts at the end of an operation.

One or several Staging Areas may be set up in-theater to sort out and recondition evacuated resources, store and reposition them on transport platforms.

A final staging area for onward movement may be activated in mainland France. In addition to maintaining a secure environment, land forces contribute to disengagements mainly in the domains of transport, handling, mobility and movement support.

3.2 Commitment on the national territory¹¹⁰

In addressing threats likely to affect the population or the smooth running of the State, the sole capabilities of civilian resources can be overwhelmed. The armed forces can complement State capabilities, particularly in emergency situations or where they are absent, unsuitable, inadequate or unavailable.¹¹¹

Supporting the action of the State agencies on the national territory during crises is a mission of paramount importance. The land forces have rare, dual-use capabilities that must be used in a centralized way to be effective. From the expression of effects to achieve determined by the civilian authorities, the capabilities needed are implemented under the Joint Chief of Staff authority.

108 *Centre Interarmées de Conduite de la Logistique Opérationnelle (CICLO)* in French.

109 *Centre multimodal des transports (CMT)* in French.

110 References:

- DIA 01(A)1 DEF(2014) – *Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces*;
- DIA 3.32 - *Land Commitments on the National Territory* (ETTN), no. 143/DEF/CICDE/DR (Restricted), August 31, 2011;
- PIA 3.32.1 – *Joint Directive on the Use of Force in the Framework of Missions on the National Territory, apart from a State of Exception (Ground Environment)*, no. D-10-00-002077/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP, November 23, 2010;
- PIA 3.34 - *Vigipirate*, to be released in 2014;
- PIA 3.35 (A) – *Joint Territorial Defense Organization* (OTIAD), no. D-12-002694/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP, April 20, 2012;
- PIA 3.36 – *Joint Permanent Command outside Metropolitan France*, no. D-11-006137/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP, August 10, 2011;
- PIA 3.39 *Manual on the Planning and Conduct of the Participation of Armed Forces in the Protection of Major Events (such as Summits)*, no. D-13-004658/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP, April 16, 2013.

111 So-called rule of the “4 I”s - *Inexistants* (inexistent), *Insuffisants* (inadequate), *Inadaptés* (unsuitable) and *Indisponibles* (unavailable) for the deployment of armed forces’ capabilities on the national territory.


However, land forces are not first responders as they usually act in support of the decentralized services of the Ministry of the Interior. In the event of major crisis, they commit their readily available potential by prioritizing areas where they bring added value. They have particularly effective equipment in terms of helicopters, engineering, reconnaissance and observation, CBRN, logistics and signals, as well as personnel trained for security missions. They can operate day and night, over the long term, and in hostile environments under degraded conditions.

In this joint, interagency environment, land forces are deployed to:

- provide authorities with a range of capabilities to respond to natural, health, industrial and humanitarian disasters as well as “blocked” situations;
- participate in sovereignty missions, in mainland France and overseas French territories, by providing a deterrent and participating in surveillance of borders and vital importance access and entry points;
- contribute to maintaining the smooth running of the institutions;
- ensure vital flows on the national territory.

INTERAGENCY CRISIS CENTRE

Source : PFT 3.32, ex EMP 50.011 Edition 2015



ACRONYMS :

CCPM : Cellule de Crise du Premier Ministre/ **Prime Minister's Crisis Unit**

CIC : Centre Interministériel de Crise/ **Interagency Crisis Centre**

CICoS : Centre Interarmées de Coordination du Soutien/**Joint Coordination Center for Support**

COD : Centre Opérationnel Départemental/ **Département Operations Center**

COGIC : Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises/

Interagency Crisis Management Operations Centre

COP : Centre Opérationnel de la Police/**Police Operations Center**

COZ : Centre Opérationnel de Zone/ **Zone Operations Center**

CROGEND : Centre de Renseignement Opérationnel de la Gendarmerie/

Gendarmerie Intelligence and Operations Center

EMIZ : Etat-Major Interministériel de la Zone/ **Interagency Headquarters of the Zone**

3.2.1 Context of use

The 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security stresses that **protecting the national territory** and ensuring the continuity of the Nation's essential functions are France's first strategic priority. To do so, national territories and their approaches (in Metropolitan France and overseas¹¹² must be controlled and surveilled. The permanent posture of security is based on the mission that is incumbent on the State. It includes all the measures taken in land, maritime, air, and space environments and in the cyberspace in order to protect the country in all circumstances from an aggression, even limited, against its territory or its interests. In this context, the primary mission of the armed forces is to ensure the protection of the Nation against any threat of a military nature. The armed forces are responsible for permanently ensuring the security of the territory, its air space and its maritime approaches. In the event of a major crisis, the armed forces can deploy **up to 10,000 personnel from the land forces** in support of interior security and civilian security forces, together with appropriate resources provided by the sea and air forces.

National Territory : Operation Sentinelle and reinforcement of Vigipirate, January 2015

- The attack at the head office of the newspaper Charlie Hebdo on 7 January and the shooting at Montrouge the following day caused the VIGIPIRATE plan to be raised to "attack alert" level in the Ile-de-France region on 7 January and across Picardie from 8 until 11 January. At the request of the President of the Republic, the Armed Forces deployed more than 10,000 troops on the national territory over 7 days, in accordance with the operational contract set by the White Paper.



112 Furthermore, in a context of tension as regards access to resources, France must be prepared to exercise its sovereignty and defend its interests in its overseas territories. This means that it must be able to conduct surveillance, control and possibly act militarily in response to a State or non-State threat likely to undermine the integrity of its territory. It may require establishing a visible and deterrent military presence and protecting entry points (seaports and airports) to send reinforcement forces if need be.

“Lessons Learned” elements have underscored the following points:

- outstanding responsiveness from the chain of command and the Armed Forces;*
- the PROTERRE system and the NEPTUNE plan proved their worth through enabling the selection, deliverance and deployment of units on the national territory in a smooth and responsive manner;*
- effective support from the joint mainlines;*
- Input which leaves room for improvement but that was nonetheless valid from the Guépard reserve;*
- Quality of French Army troops (stamina; autonomy; flexibility; controlled use of force);*
- Interoperability that leaves room for improvement with elements of the Ministry of the Interior (CIS).*

The request for assistance: this is issued by the Prefect of the Zone or the *département*. Most often, it is a request for occasional participation in activities of general security. Generally, it is part of the direct contribution from armed forces to civil support, homeland security and timely aid to state services. Military authorities can refuse the request. The aid sought usually entails a transfer of funds from the ministry benefitting from the armed forces' action to the Department of Defense.

The requisition: this cannot be refused by military authorities and cannot be systematically charged to the budget (notably in the case of crowd control). The requisition can take two main forms:

- a) **Administrative requisition:** this is issued by the Prefect of the Zone or of the *département*. It is the most commonly used means by which the armed forces intervene on the national territory.

Administrative requisition is generally issued to deploy forces:

- in crowd control operations (always alongside homeland security forces, who are the first responders). Crowd control is put in place via a general or specific requisition (e.g. for supporting the Gendarmerie as part of their missions in combatting illegal gold panning, illegal immigration and the restoration of state facilities). When necessary, this is followed by a special complementary requisition that, in certain circumstances, can authorize the use of weapons (e.g. liberating the hostages from the cave in Ouvéa, New Caledonia in 1988).
- in the fight against terrorism¹¹³
- in the event of a major crisis on the national territory¹¹⁴

Military units deployed in homeland security or civil support operations act under the responsibility of the relevant civilian authority (Prefect of the Defense and Security Zone, or of the *département*) and under military command. Units also act in liaison with the police or gendarmerie authorities of the disposition of homeland security forces, or with the commander of emergency operations for civil support operations.

- b) **Judicial requisition:** this is issued by a judicial authority¹¹⁵, taking note of one or several offences and, if necessary, the need to find the perpetrator(s).

113 IIM 650 *Public part of the VIGIPIRATE government plan for vigilance, prevention and protection against terrorist threats, 17 January 2014* and IM 10200 *Confidential part of the VIGIPIRATE government plan for vigilance, prevention and protection against terrorist threats, 17 January 2014.*

114 IIM 10100 related to *Deployment of the armed forces on the national territory in the event of a major crisis, 3 May 2010.*

115 Senior prosecutors, prosecutors, investigating judges, officers from the criminal police (OPJ).

National territory: Operation Harpie in French Guiana, 2010

This interagency operation commits more than 300 service members into the Guyanese forest every day in order to stop ever-increasing illegal gold panning. Military assets support those of the Ministries of the Interior, of Ecology and Sustainable Development, and of Justice, collaborating with the National Forestry Agency and French Guiana's Amazonian Park to rehabilitate government-owned property.

In this context, a joint mission was conducted from November 29 to December 17, 2010, in the Dékou-Dékou mountains, approximately 100 kilometers south of the town of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni.

The operation was launched by the Prefect and commanded by the Joint HQ, Armed Forces in French Guiana, via the tactical CP of the 9th RIMa¹¹⁶, supported by gendarmes.

After a meticulous secret preparation with Gendarmerie staff, a combined arms company of the 9th RIMa, reinforced by a Gendarmerie platoon, sneaked into the jungle and seized three objectives in order to neutralize illegal gold panning sites.

Each time, a mixed platoon (9th RIMa/Gendarmerie) seized an objective after landing by helicopters or driving to the site. At the same time, squads would cordon off the site using vehicles, helicopters or canoes.

The following assets were eventually deployed in the jungle: 70 Marine infantrymen, 55 gendarmes and 6 helicopters (from the Air Force, the Gendarmerie and a private contractor). The military rules of employment specific to Operation Harpie made it compulsory to always have a criminal police officer (OPJ) in each rifle squad for control of individuals and goods, and even seizures and arrests. The judicial requisition of criminal police officers also enabled the military to assist the Gendarmerie in their investigations.

At the end of the operation, the following were seized or destroyed by order of the Public Prosecutor: 137 huts, 15 quads, 3 metric tons of food, more than 5,000 liters of fuel, radio sets, weapons, and gold panning equipment. Gold washers, who were illegal immigrants and had been arrested on the sites, were then returned to their countries of origin by the French Air and Border Police.

¹¹⁶ Régiment d'Infanterie de Marine: a Marine Infantry battalion.

In all circumstances, **land forces intervene on the national territory alongside security forces and assets from other ministries** during homeland security and civil support operations, as soon as civilian and gendarmerie assets have proved Inexistants (non-existent), Insuffisants (inadequate), Inadaptés (unsuitable) and Indisponibles (unavailable) (the so-called 4i rule).

The civilian authority making the request sets the intended effect for military forces that then act under the command of their leaders. These leaders decide on the organization, the assets to be used, the rules on the use of force (REF) and the most suitable course of behavior¹¹⁷.

A broader legal framework applies in exceptional circumstances or even war on the national territory. The system of requisitions and requests remains, although added to this are derogating measures that position land forces in an “ultima ratio” (last resort) posture for addressing the crisis.

- **Article 16¹¹⁸** of the Constitution: this grants the President of the Republic exceptional powers in the event of a major crisis.
- **The National Security Reserve disposition¹¹⁹**: in the event of a major crisis, this allows the Prime Minister to convene reservists by decree, in as short a time as possible and for a period of activity longer than those usually in force.
- **The National Security Service¹²⁰**: this is aimed at guaranteeing the continuity of the state action, local authorities and the agencies attached to them, as well as those businesses and establishments whose activity contributes to national security. This disposition has been shelved at the Ministry of Defense since national service was suspended.
- **Warning and mobilization¹²¹**: these are specific measures for ensuring the Government’s freedom of action, reducing the degree of vulnerability of the populace and of main equipment and guaranteeing the security of mobilization operations or use of military forces. They are decreed in the Council of Ministers (*Conseil des ministres*).

117 See PIA 3.32 *Implementing the operational protection contract within the armed forces*, 7 November 2012.

118 “Where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures required by these circumstances, after formally consulting the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the assemblies and the Constitutional Council”.

119 Article L2171-1 to 7 of the French Defense Code (*code de la Défense*).

120 Article L111-1 of the French Defense Code and Decree no. 2015-508 of 7 May 2015 related to the national security service and the national security reserve disposition.

121 Articles L.2141-1 to 4 of the French Defense Code.

- **State of Emergency**¹²²: this can be declared for a maximum of 12 days by a decree from the Council of Ministers and extended to a longer period by law. In a state of emergency, the Prefect is granted extra police powers, while the armed forces are not necessarily granted any extra powers.
- **State of Siege**¹²³: in the event of imminent peril, police and even judicial powers are transferred to military authorities. A state of siege is decreed in the Council of Ministers.
- **Military Home Defense (DOT)**¹²⁴: this covers all military ground actions conducted within France's borders for ensuring the security and the integrity of the national territory. It is implemented by government decision in the event of an outside threat that has been recognized by the Council of Defense and Security, or one the government has assessed but whose source is impossible to determine immediately.

3.2.2 Command and control¹²⁵

These deployments involve the capabilities of the three service components as well as joint directorates and services. They **complement security forces and the assets of other government departments**. They are usually under civilian responsibility, as the armed forces implement their efforts on a **contributor** and **supporting commander** basis.

Command organization for air-land deployments on the national territory is based on the **Joint Territorial Defense Organization**¹²⁶. This joint operational chain is permanent, providing a civil-military interface and carrying out dialogue with the Prefecture. Military capabilities are committed under **operational command of the Joint Chief of Staff**, who delegates **operational control** of forces and assets to the **general officers commanding defense and security zones**.

The "Defense Zone Headquarters" (*EMZD*) located in Paris, Lyon, Bordeaux, Metz and Rennes have been formed, as have joint organizations (OIA), from 1 July 2014. The *EMZD* are responsible for assisting the *OGZDS*, as well as the organic Army territorial commanders they have been placed with, in exercising their respective functions. The Joint Headquarters of the Defense and Security Zone (*EMIAZDS*) in Lille and Marseille retain their functions as part of the OTIAD chain.

¹²² Article 36 of the French Constitution and Articles L 2121-1 to 8 of the French Defense Code.

¹²³ Article 36 of the French Constitution and Articles L 2121-1 to 8 of the French Defense Code.

¹²⁴ Articles L1321-2 and 1421 and 1422 of the French Defense Code.

¹²⁵ Reference: *DIA 3(A) 1 CEO (2014) – Command of Operational Engagements* no. 151/DEF/CICDE/DR, June 25, 2014.

¹²⁶ *PIA 3.35 (A) – Joint Territorial Defense Organization (OTIAD)*, no. D-12-002694/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP, April 20, 2012.

As regards the contribution of the armed forces to the operation and command organization, the **distinction between the three levels** (strategic, operational, and tactical) usually applies to missions on the national territory¹²⁷. The operational level is therefore supported in major crises at regional or department level by command structures from the Ministry of the Interior, the tactical level ensuring local implementation on the ground (districts, cities, etc.). Like operations outside national territory, **merging operational and tactical levels may be considered** during small-scale engagements.

When commitments take place mainly on the ground, like in French Guiana, the mission then depends strongly on the environment and Land CPs may be set up, reinforced as deemed necessary by elements from other service components and government departments, without systematically implementing service component CPs.

The level of the Land Tactical CPs depends on engagement scope and the size of deployed forces¹²⁸.

3.2.3 Capabilities likely to be deployed

Using forces systems¹²⁹ and main capabilities¹³⁰ approach, the table below shows what the land forces can provide or deploy in a generic manner during domestic missions.

127 Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center (Command and Control, National Territory) at strategic level, Joint Defense and Security Zone HQs (or Higher Military Authorities' Joint HQs for overseas sovereignty forces), of which the key core is armed by either the EMZD (Paris, Lyon, Bordeaux, Metz, Rennes) or EMIAZDS (Lille, Marseille) or EMIA COMSUP (sovereign forces overseas) at operational level, and one of the tactical CPs at different levels depending on the nature and size of the air-land engagement at tactical level.

128 For example, the NEPTUNE plan (100-year flood of the River Seine) makes provisions for the commitment of a Force HQ in the command structures of a force of approximately 10,000 troops. As part of operation Sentinelle, 10,188 land force troops were deployed out of 10,323 joint troops on 28 January, 2015.

129 Five forces systems are defined: "Deterrence," "Command and Information Control," "Projection, Mobility and Sustainment," "Engagement and Combat," and "Protection and Safeguard." The "Deterrence" forces system is not mentioned in this document because it is entirely dedicated to the strategic function of that same name.

130 It is recalled that a capability is a coherent set of human resources, equipment, support, training, organization, and doctrines. Even where military services do not have capabilities dedicated to the national territory, this dimension introduces the notion of "dual use" in certain weapons systems and equipment.

Force Systems	Main Capabilities	Actions
Command and information Control	Command and Conduct	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning and conduct of operations. - Supporting continuity of the Government's action (availability of planning and conduct means).
	Communi-cations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational information and satellite communications systems, radio networks and associated crypto-equipment. - Supporting continuity of the Government's action (availability of planning and conduct means).
	Intelligence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Satellite observations (sensors and analysis equipment). - Area surveillance (electromagnetic, optronics). - Area reconnaissance. - SA2R (Surveillance, Targeting objectives, Intelligence and Reconnaissance). - Assessment of the threat.
Projection, Mobility, Sustainment	Force deployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transport of military and security forces and other players as well as associated logistics.
	Mobility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transport and availability as close as possible to the battle location for military and security forces and other players. - Evacuation of civilian victims. - Restoring routes and rebuilding bridges, rehabilitation of sites. - Crossing support. - Management of traffic flows.
	Maintaining capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sustainment (personnel, equipment, ammunition, POL, stationing) of military and security forces, other players and the populations.

Force Systems	Main Capabilities	Actions
Engagement and Combat	Operation in hostile environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection of PIV¹³¹ and symbolic places by professional units in degraded situations. - Terrain management.
Protection and Safeguarding	Security of access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Surveillance of borders. - ADA assets integrated in the Air component.
	Protection of forces and sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection de PIV, symbolic places and particular locations designated by control and command. - Décontamination. - Demining and depollution.
	People protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Medical and/or CBRN support of security forces and other players. - Medical and/or CBRN support of victims. - Aid and assistance to the population.
	Security of the State and its citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Area surveillance. - Security operations. - Search for missing persons. - Air-land rescue missions.

131 Point d'Intérêt Vitaux.

3.2.4 The particular case of the “Protection Contract”¹³²

Major crises require a comprehensive response from the State. Depending on the environment and size of crises, this response can be provided in liaison with external European or regional partners (as is the case in particular in French overseas territories)¹³³.

On the national territory, the implementation of the “protection contract” results from a **political decision at the highest level** and is based on the scenario of a reinforced major crisis. This decision demonstrates the will of the government to **commit its strategic reserve** to end crisis situations.

The document *IM 10 100* describes the framework of armed forces employment in case of crisis, based on **four generic scenarios**:

- a major terrorist attack;
- a massive, highly lethal pandemic;
- a large-scale natural or industrial disaster;
- a law and order crisis.

When France is faced with a major crisis, ie. it is in an extraordinary situation, the land forces conduct their action and make contributions according to the following principles:

- **protecting** military facilities, equipment and personnel;
- ensuring **continuity** of operational activities while maintaining operational contracts;
- **reinforcing** the action of the public authorities.

132 References:

PIA-3.32 – Implementation of the Operational Protection Contract within the Armed Forces, released under no. D-12-011735DEF/EMA/EMP3 - DR, November 7, 2012;

IM 10100 (*Armed Forces Engagement on the National Territory in case of a major crisis* no. 10100/SGDSN/PSE/PPS/CD, May 3, 2010). Please note: IM 10100 without the annexes is a restricted document that is easily accessible.

133 Overseas *départements* and regions DROM/COM.

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